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Water cannot be managed for a single purpose: all water management serves multiple 
objectives and navigates among competing interests. Within a nation, these interests - 
domestic users, farmers, hydropower generators, recreational users, ecosystems - are 
often at odds, and the probability of a mutually acceptable solution falls exponentially 
in proportion to the number of stakeholders. Add international boundaries, and the 
chances drop yet again. Without a mutual solution, these parties can find themselves in 
dispute, and even violent conflict, with each other or with state authorities. Still, 
water-related disputes must be considered in the broader political, ethnic, and religious 
context. Water is never the single - and hardly ever the major - cause of conflict. But it 
can exacerbate existing tensions and therefore must be considered within the larger 




This thesis examines India’s management of the Indus River system. I will refer to this as 
Indus Basin hydropolitics in the rest of the thesis.
2
 I analyze the writings of Indian water 
experts, within the context of Indus Basin hydropolitics between 1999 and 2008. 
In this period, India and Pakistan had a dispute concerning the construction of the 
Baglihar hydroelectric project (Baglihar), on the Chenab River in India. The Baglihar dispute 
is analyzed as an important excerpt from the modern history of the Indus River, and it is 
contextualized as a case that reflects the major issues of hydropolitics in the region, i.e. the 
struggle for sharing the Indus river-waters, utilizing the river-water for hydropower 
generation, and implementing sustainable water management. 
As one of the major rivers of the world, the Indus and its tributaries (the Indus River 
system) have played an important role in great power politics and in the everyday lives of 
hundreds of millions of people for thousands of years. The Indus River system originates in 
the Himalayas, Karakoram and Hindu Kush ranges. Indus and its five main tributaries flow 
through Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in India before they reach Pakistan.  
 The Indus waters constitute most of Pakistan’s fresh water supply, and are immensely 
important to the agriculture of Pakistan. In upstream India, there are several dams for 
                                                 
1
 Aaron T. Wolf et al., "Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation," State of the World 2005: Redefining Global 
Security (2005): 81. 
2
 “Hydropolitics is the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between states over water resources that 
transcend international borders.” Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World : conflict and cooperation in 
international river basins  (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 3. 
A basin is a region where precipitation and snowmelt drain downhill into another body of water, such as a river, 
lake, or dam. 
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hydropower generation and headworks for diverting river water to irrigation canals, which 
enables Indian control over the flow of the rivers. It is therefore important for Pakistan to 
maintain a relationship with India that contributes to safeguarding their water supply.   
The Indus Basin, which is the watershed of the Indus River system, is populated by 
approximately 230 million people. India and Pakistan have to an increasing extent faced 
problems of water scarcity and poor water management in the Indus Basin since the 1990s. In 
order to provide water for their inhabitants it is essential that India and Pakistan manage and 
share their water resources sustainably and avoid conflicts over water. 
Unfortunately, India and Pakistan have a troubled relationship. Since the birth of the 
two nations in 1947, they have experienced a bloody partition, a continued dispute over 
Kashmir, three wars, violent conflicts and cross-border terrorism. Both countries have nuclear 
weapons and political oppositions whose rhetoric includes threats of war against their 
neighbor.  
Despite this, India and Pakistan have managed to cooperate over their shared water 
resources. In 1960, they signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which allocates rights of 
usage of water in the Indus River system. The treaty is famous for being unchanged and still 
functioning in 2013. Neither of the two countries has violated the treaty, not even during 
wartime.  
Since the 1990s, water relations have to an increasing extent been troublesome. 
Increasing water scarcity combined with both nations’ desire to utilize more of the water 
resources have led to a trend of ongoing disagreements concerning utilization of the Indus 
River system. The usefulness of the IWT has been questioned by Indian water experts, and 
observers have feared an Indo-Pakistani conflict over water, or an environmental disaster in 
the Indus Basin, or both. 
 It is in this context that the Baglihar dispute emerged. In 1999, India started 
constructing the Baglihar on the Chenab River, a tributary to the Indus River which was 
allocated to Pakistan under the IWT. Pakistan therefore demanded that India stopped 
constructing, because Baglihar interfered with water supply in “their river”. After years of 
negotiation, India and Pakistan were not able to find a solution bilaterally.  
3 
 
 In this thesis, I analyze Indian water experts’ attitudes towards Indus Basin 
hydropolitics during the Baglihar dispute chronologically, based on the premise that water 




Research Questions and argument 
In order to avoid conflict over water, India had to maintain cooperation with the contenders 
for water in the Indus Basin. The government of India had to balance their water sharing 
relations with Pakistan and the Indian state J&K. During the Baglihar dispute, India and 
Pakistan were on the verge of violent conflict over water, while at the same time struggling to 
cope with increasing water scarcity in the Indus Basin. Simultaneously, the state government 
of J&K criticized India for neglecting the development of hydropower in the state.  
A few mistakes in the Indian policy could have resulted in dire consequences, and 
knowledge-based advice from water experts was much in need. There were not many experts 
on Indus Basin hydropolitics in India at this time, but I argue that Indian experts played an 
important role in providing knowledge and information on how to deal with hydropolitical 
issues, by participating in debates that constituted a particular element to the overall Baglihar 
dispute.  The Baglihar dispute was an on-going long-term tension, and such tensions are 
usually not resolved within a forum of conflict processing, because they may emerge again 
and require further processing. The debates carried out by Indian experts can be viewed as a 
form of conflict management.  
In making my argument, I pose the following two research questions: 
 
a) How was the hydropolitical situation in the Indus Basin during the Baglihar dispute?  
 
b) What knowledge and information did the Indian water experts provide on Indus Basin 
hydropolitics during the Baglihar dispute? 
 
By answering the first question, I provide the necessary context in order to answer the second 
question.  
 
                                                 
3
 Geoffrey D. Gooch and Alistair Rieu-Clarke, "The Science-Policy-Stakeholder Interface and Transboundary 
Water Regimes," in Science, Policy and Stakeholders in Water Management, ed. Geoffrey D. Gooch and Per 
Stålnacke (London: Earthscan, 2010). 
4 
 
The Indian perspective 
I have chosen to focus on Indian perspectives on the Baglihar dispute. There are three reasons 
for this: First, India is in many ways the dominant part in this bilateral issue. They are the 
upper riparian country and therefore have more control over the Indus waters than Pakistan 
does. India can divert water before it reaches Pakistan; India can hold back water in dams and 
reservoirs; and India can pollute the waters before they flow into Pakistan. American 
Professor of Political Science, Neda Zawahri, argues that Pakistan also has the ability to affect 
the river on the Indian side of the border, but these means must be viewed as minor compared 
to India’s.4 What India decides to do with the water resources is therefore interesting for both 




 The other two reasons for focusing on the Indian perspectives are practical. Most 
Indian scholars write their texts in English and I was therefore able to read Indian articles and 
newspapers, which make up my source material. The third reason was that I was able to get an 
internship at an Indian research institute were I undertook a field study in 2011. 
 
The chronological end of the analysis 
A problem with writing history on contemporary history is setting a chronological end of the 
study. Aspects of the Baglihar dispute is still debated (May, 2013) and is therefore still on-
going.
 6
 The official end of the official Baglihar dispute between the Government of India and 
the Government of Pakistan can be set somewhere between 2007 and 2010 depending on the 
definition of dispute.  
The end of this analysis is set to late 2008, but includes certain aspects from the period 
after 2008. There are three reasons for ending the analysis in 2008: First, the official Baglihar 
dispute had just ended and the dam was commissioned. Second, the attention towards Indus 
Basin hydropolitics began focusing on the Kishenganga dispute instead of the Baglihar 
dispute. And third, in November 2008, ten Pakistani terrorists trained by Lashkar-e-Tayiba 
                                                 
4
 Neda A. Zawahri, "International rivers and national security: The Euphrates, Ganges–Brahmaputra, Indus, 
Tigris, and Yarmouk rivers," Natural Resources Forum 32, no. 4 (2008): p. 283-84. 
5
 For several years, Pakistani engineers have argued that Pakistan should build a huge reservoir in the Skardu 
Valley.  
6
 This has to do with another water dispute between India and Pakistan. The Indian Kishenganga project dispute 
were taken to the International Court of Arbitration in Haag, July 2010. The verdict was presented in February 
2013 and it contrasted the decision in the Baglihar case, thereby questioning the validity of the verdict of the 
Baglihar dispute. This will be clarified at the end of chapter 4. 
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killed 163 people and wounded 300 in terror attacks in Mumbai.
7
 According to Ahmed 
Rashid, “The Mumbai attack brought India and Pakistan close to war.”8 The US government 
accused the leader of the Pakistani militant group Jamaat-u-Dawa, Hafiz Saeed, of being one 
of the organizers of terror attacks.
9
 The role of Saeed is relevant because he has highlighted 
how important the Indus River system is to Pakistan. Saeed has accused India constructing 
"illegal dams",
10
 and of diverting water from rivers allocated to Pakistan under the IWT. He 
has therefore demanded that the Pakistani government should take action against what he calls 
“Indian water terrorism.”11 Protest marches, led by Saeed, have used slogans and banners 
threatening India with “water flows or blood” and “water or war”.12 The position of Saeed is 
supported by many in Pakistan. For example, in 2011, Pakistani newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt 
encouraged the Pakistan government to take action against the alleged water theft of India, 
stating that: “Pakistan should convey to India that a war is possible on the issue of water and 
this time war will be a nuclear one.”13 Thus, this might change the future conflicts over water 
sharing. 
 
Contextualizing the Baglihar dispute 
In the following, I give my reasons for choosing the Baglihar dispute as a case, with an 
emphasis on the connection between the Baglihar dispute and the history of the Indus Basin in 
general and water sharing relations of India and Pakistan in particular. 
The Indus Basin has seen great civilizations and many different rulers, it is home of 
several hundred million inhabitants and the world's largest irrigation system, and it has 
experienced numerous floods and droughts.
 
The Indus Basin has also been the battlefield of 
several wars, and India and Pakistan have been in armed conflict on top of the Indus River’s 
glacial headwaters, the Siachen.  
                                                 
7
 Stanley Wolpert, India and Pakistan: Continued conflict or cooperation?  (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2010), p. 3. 
8
 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the brink : the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West  (London: Allen Lane, 
2012), p. 57. 
9
 Saeed has denied any connection to the terror attacks. 
10




 Niharika Mandhana, "Water wars: why India and Pakistan are squaring of over their rivers," Time, 16 April 
2012. 
13
 Quoted in "Unquenchable thirst," The Economist, 19 November 2011. 
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India began constructing Baglihar in 1999 and finished it in 2008.
14
 During these 
years, Pakistan protested against the construction, arguing that Baglihar interfered with the 
flow of water in Chenab River and would cause harm to downstream areas in Pakistan.
15
 
Pakistani officials claimed that Baglihar would give India too much control over the river 
flow. Pakistan's objections caused a delay in the construction, and the following negotiations 
involved high ranking diplomats, the Foreign Secretaries of both nations, and the World 
Bank. The dispute was officially solved in 2007. This was the first time India and Pakistan 
were not able to solve one of their hydropolitical issues through bilateral negotiations. 
 According to the provisions of the IWT, the dispute was officially termed 
"differences", but this thesis has a different focus than examining the official negotiations. 
This is a study of the debates about Baglihar carried out by Indian water experts, and because 
of the risks involved and the tension in the debates, it is more precise to term the debates 
connected to Baglihar a "dispute". In order to emphasize the difficult situation, Indian media 
and observers linked water conflict with the Baglihar dispute, and Baglihar attracted more 
attention from Indian written press towards the IWT than ever before. The Baglihar dispute 
can be viewed as a “conflict”, but I have chosen to use “dispute”, since conflict easily can be 
confused with, or interpreted as violent conflict by the reader. 
The Baglihar dispute encapsulates many of the different aspects of Indo-Pakistan 
relations in general, and hydropolitics in the Indus Basin specifically. I will highlight three 
aspects of the Baglihar dispute which makes it an interesting case study in order to understand 
the contemporary history of the Indus Basin.  
The first aspect is Baglihar's geographic position. Baglihar is located in J&K, a partly 
autonomous state in India, viewed by Pakistan and most Kashmiris as disputed territory. The 
Indian constitution divides the power sharing between the federal government and the states 
in India in three lists: The Union list, the State list, and the Concurrent list. The Union and 
State lists describe the items which the federal government and the states respectively have 
exclusive power to legislate. J&K has a special autonomy which says that:  
 
                                                 
14
 India plans to upgrade it to a 900MW project; Chandrakant D. Thatte, "Indus Waters and the 1960 Treaty 
between India and Pakistan," in Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, ed. O. Varis, C. Tortajada, 
and A. K. Biswas, Water Resources Development and Management (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin, 2008). 
15
 "The Indus Waters Treaty,"  in 419 U.N.T.S. 126. (Signed in Karachi, 19 September 1960). 
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no law enacted by the Parliament of India, except for those in the field of defense, 
communication and foreign policy, will be extendable in Jammu and Kashmir unless it 





The IWT is controversial because it denies J&K rights to consume (through irrigation), and to 
store water from the Indus River system that run through the state. The legislative assembly of 
J&K has several times expressed a desire to build more hydroelectric projects on the western 
rivers in order to generate more electricity. But when India and Pakistan signed the IWT in 
1960, these rivers were allocated to Pakistan. 
The different Government of India has partially supported the J&K government, but 
the Government of Indian and other Indian states are also eager to transfer water and potential 
hydroelectricity from J&K to other parts of the country, especially to New Delhi. The 
Government of Pakistan objects to any kind of infrastructure on the three western Indus 
Rivers which might interfere with the flow of water. Baglihar is therefore, because of its 
geographic position, a part of what has been called "the unfinished business of partition".
17
 
Secondly, the Baglihar dispute illustrated the water crisis in the Indus Basin in a micro 
perspective. The Baglihar is defined as a run-of-the-river hydro project, which implies that it 
does not divert any water, and it does not have a large reservoir that enables India to hold 
back huge amounts of water for a long period of time. But if the design of Baglihar does not 
interfere with the amount of water flowing to Pakistan, why did it become a dispute? The 
answer to this lies partly in the ecological situation in the Indus Basin. There are serious 
environmental challenges in the Indus River system and their magnitude seems to be growing. 
This will be further explained in the thesis, but the main linkage between the Baglihar dispute 
and the environmental issues, is what Baglihar symbolizes in a water scarce Pakistan. 
Pakistan has been labeled as "water stressed" for many years and is close to facing “water 
scarcity” which is below an average of 1000m3 of water per person per year.18 Any 
interference with the river water upstream in India will be feared in downstream Pakistan, 
even a run-of-the-river project such as Baglihar. 
                                                 
16
 A.S. Anand, The constitution of Jammu & Kashmir: its development & comments  (Universal Book Traders, 
1994). 
17
 By for example former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf: Alvin Powell, "Pakistan's Musharraf speaks 
at KSG," Harvard University Gazette, 19 September 2002., accessed online at 
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/2002/09.19/19-musharraf.html, 10 January 2013.  
18
 D. R. Archer et al., "Sustainability of water resources management in the Indus Basin under changing climatic 
and socio economic conditions," Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. 14, no. 8 (2010)., accessed 2 August 2012, 
And the Aquastat database from Food and Agriculture organization 
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The third aspect of Baglihar that connects it to the Indus Basin history in general, and 
Indo-Pak water relations specifically, is the cooperation between the two nations during the 
dispute. The negotiations and the official solution to the dispute provided another example 
that India and Pakistan actually are able to cooperate over water under difficult conditions. At 
least cooperate on a minimum level, which enables them to avoid conflict. This is an example 
of why the IWT has become a famous water treaty. India and Pakistan have not violated the 
treaty since its creation and they have continued cooperation according to the provisions of 
the IWT, even during wartime. Almost 20 years after World Bank vice-president Ismail 
Serageldin proclaimed that "the wars of the next century will be about water,"
19
 a prophesy 
which found a lot of support, India and Pakistan have proven that they are able to avoid 
conflict over water.  
To sum up, this thesis contextualizes the Baglihar dispute as an essential part of Indus 
Basin history and Indo-Pakistani relations. In order to achieve this, the Indus Waters Treaty, 
and the commission under it, have played an important role. 
 
The Indus Waters Treaty 
The partition of India in 1947 bisected the Indus River system and the vast irrigation system 
within the basin, between India and Pakistan. The Ferozepur and Madhopur headworks, vital 
for the irrigation canals in Pakistani Punjab, were located in Indian territory.   
In December 1947, a temporary agreement on allocation of water from India to 
Pakistan was signed. This agreement was set to expire March 1948, while the two countries 
fought the first Kashmir War. On April 1, 1948 the Indian provincial government in East 
Punjab shut off the supply of water from canals leading into Pakistan.
20
  
This demonstrated the immense power India had over Pakistan, as the upper riparian 
power in the Indus Basin. Indian constructions on the Indus River system could have an 
adverse effect on the quantity and quality of the water running into Pakistan. The water 
running through the Indus and its tributaries accounts for almost all of Pakistan’s water 
supply. The north-western parts of India are hugely dependent on the Indus Basin, but not 
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 Aaron T. Wolf, "Conflict and cooperation along international waterways," Water Policy 1, no. 2 (1998). 
20
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der Universität Heidelberg, --.10.2008,  http://archiv.ub.uni-
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Although the first Kashmir War ended late 1948, it did not result in a long term plan for 
cooperation along the Indus River system. Negotiations began immediately after the war 
ended, but progress seemed absent. The World Bank worked as a mediator from 1951 and 
proposed a solution in 1954. It took six more years of bargaining before the IWT was signed 
by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan President Mohammad Ayub Khan in 
1960.
23
 According to Former senior water adviser for the World Bank in New Delhi, John 
Briscoe, the reason it took a decade to negotiate was:  
                                                 
22
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Indus_river.svg 
23
 Neda A. Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system," Water Policy 11, no. 1 
(2009). 
Map of the Indus Basin:  
Dotted line: International 
borders and the Line of Control. 




Because of the thorny issue of balancing, on the one hand, the reasonable expectation 
by India that it could use the hydroelectric potential of ‘Pakistan’s rivers’ (The Chenab, 
Jhelum and Indus) before these rivers entered Pakistan and, on the other, the 
reasonable expectation by Pakistan that this would neither decrease the flow to 
Pakistan nor change the timing of the flow. This was dealt with in the IWT essentially 
by hardwiring into the Treaty limitations on the amount of manipulable (or “live”) 




This “thorny issue of balancing” would also be an important aspect of the Baglihar dispute 
almost 50 years later. 
The IWT divided the rights of utilization of the Indus River system between India and 
Pakistan. In addition to the Indus River, the treaty dealt specifically with Indus’ five main 
tributaries: the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. India received rights 
over the three latter, which were named the Eastern Rivers. The rights to the Western Rivers: 
Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.
25
 Pakistan received a one-time 
compensation of 62 million pounds sterling as India gained rights over canals from the 
Eastern Rivers leading to Pakistan.
26
 India (supported by the World Bank) paid the 
compensation so Pakistan should be able to: 
 
construct and bring into operation, with due regard to expedition and economy, that 
part of a system of works which will accomplish the replacement, from the Western 
Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 
15
th





India and Pakistan are required to inform the other country if “either Party plans to construct 
any engineering work which would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers 
and which, in its opinion, would affect the other Party materially.”28  
The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) was created to ensure that neither of the two 
countries revoked the treaty. The PIC consists of a “high-ranking engineer competent in the 
field of hydrology and water-use” from each nation and the Commissioners “will be the 
representative of his Government for all matters arising out of this Treaty”.29 The PIC 
                                                 
24
 John Briscoe, "Winning the battle but losing the war,"  The Hindu(2013), 
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25
 Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article I-III 
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 Ibid, Article V 
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 Ibid, Article IV 
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 The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article VII(2) 
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 Ibid, Article VIII 
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members are required to meet regularly, and have done so at least annually since the treaty’s 
creation.  
Article IX in the treaty describes in detail the mechanism when a question is raised 
about an Indus Basin water issue, and the PIC is the prioritised authority to resolve it. Several 
PIC meetings are often required to arrive at conclusions. If the PIC is unable to settle a 
dispute, the issue is dealt with by India and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretaries.30 If the Foreign 
Secretaries are unable to resolve the dispute, one of the two countries may request a Neutral 
Expert, or an International Court of Arbitration to deal with the dispute.
31
 The PIC has 
resolved almost all of the questions raised, since its creation. Among the successful 
negotiations was the agreement in 1982 on the amount of water India can irrigate from the 
Western Rivers. The PIC has also negotiated an enhanced delivery method of flood warnings 
from India to Pakistan.
32
 Until the late 1980s, the IWT was not a major issue in Indo-Pak 
relations. A relatively stable IWT moderated competition for the Indus waters between the 
neighbouring countries.
33
 Briscoe has summed up the history of the IWT and PIC in a single 
paragraph:  
 
As has often been recounted, the IWT worked well for decades, even through periods 
when India and Pakistan were at war. But the truth of the matter is that the Treaty was 
not really under stress until India started (quite appropriately, in my view) building 
hydropower plants across the Himalayas, and, in particular, on its side of the Line of 




While the correlation between hydroelectric projects and increasing issues under the IWT is 
valid, I also point out in this thesis that the IWT came under a lot of criticism from J&K 
because it allegedly hindered development in J&K. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis analyses the decade long Baglihar dispute, and is divided in five chapters. Chapter 
two presents the source material, the methodological approach and the theoretical framework 
                                                 
30
 Neda A. Zawahri, "Designing river commissions to implement treaties and manage water disputes: the story of 
the Joint Water Committee and Permanent Indus Commission," Water International 33, no. 4 (2008). 
31
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32
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34
 Briscoe, "Winning the battle but losing the war". 
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applied in this thesis. Chapter three and four contain the main analysis of the thesis, and are 
structured chronologically and partly thematically.  
Chapter three describes and analyzes the developments from 1999 to the end of 2004. 
This was the beginning of the Baglihar dispute and shows that there is increased interest in 
Indus Basin hydropolitics, but not particularly towards the Baglihar dispute. This period was 
also marked by increasing dissatisfaction with the IWT in J&K. The paradigm of IWRM in 
water management clearly affected the Indian water experts, and there were suggestions on 
how to implement an IWRM-approach in the Indus Basin. I aim to understand the different 
perspectives that characterized debates on Indus Basin hydropolitics. 
 Chapter four is solely about the Baglihar dispute. In January 2005, Pakistan asked a 
third party to settle the Baglihar dispute, making it the first time India and Pakistan were 
unable to solve a water issue bilaterally. The Indian water experts urged India to be calm and 
put trust in the neutral expert, but also expressed increased concern over India’s water 
management. There were dissatisfaction and anger in India directed towards Pakistan’s 
politics of objecting to India’s hydropower projects in J&K, and this led to increased interest 
in the Pakistan perspectives. Water issues gained a more prominent role in Indo-Pakistani 
relations.  
In chapter five I summarize the findings and conclude how the findings have answered 




2. Theory and methodology 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The first time I learned about transboundary river issues was in a book by Terje Tvedt from 
1997.
35
 He wrote that India and Pakistan had waged war over the Indus in the 1940s,
36
 and 
that "India cut off the water supply to major Pakistani cities in 1949."
37
 The geopolitics of 
India and Pakistan have long been an interest of mine, especially the unfinished business of 
Kashmir, and I learned that the truth was a bit more complex than how Tvedt described it. But 
the fact that one nation has the ability to shut of water supply to another country is intriguing. 
Almost all of Pakistan's fresh water supply comes from India, and given their troubled 
relationship and the shrinking water per capita in the region, I understood that this was a field 
of study where much was at stake.  
In this chapter I present the source material, the methodological approach, and the 
theoretical framework applied in this thesis. 
 
Source material and methodological approach 
The source material, and the approaches to them, can be divided into three groups. The main 
group of source material consists of documents published by Indian water experts in the 
1990s and 2000s. The second group of sources consists of Indian newspaper articles about 
Indus Basin hydropolitics during the Baglihar dispute.  The third group of sources is based on 
a four month long field study I undertook in New Delhi, in 2011.  
The three groups of source material are overlapping: some of the documents written by 
water experts are newspaper articles, and some of the water experts and journalists from 
newspapers participated in discussions and seminars I attended during the field study. The 
methodological approaches to the sources are also overlapping. All three groups of sources 
are important in order to understand the Indus Basin hydropolitics and the role of Indian water 
experts during the Baglihar dispute. 
The texts that are analyzed were written by a group of scholars, Indian water experts, 
who provided knowledge and information on hydropolitical issues during the Baglihar 
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dispute. The analyzing of attitudes and perspectives of experts over time and putting them in 
their context, is an attempt at writing intellectual history. A trend in Indian historiography the 
last 30 years have been subaltern studies which “concentrate on the subordinated parts of the 
population, the lower castes and primarily the peasants who had been generally ignored in the 
conventional elite historiography of the Indian nation.”38 The Indian intellectuals have gotten 
less, and perhaps too little, critical attention on account of the subaltern preoccupation. The 
theoretical framework of intellectual historical writing applied in this thesis will be presented 
later in this chapter. 
 The approach applied towards the source material is a document analysis. A historical 
document-analysis first of all seeks to establish a chronology, and place the documents within 
their context. The context in this analysis is Indus Basin hydropolitics and the Baglihar 
dispute. 
 In the following, the three groups of source material will be presented. 
(i) Indian water experts – a document analysis 
Documents written by Indian water experts commenting on the Baglihar dispute constitute the 
main part of the source material. This thesis analyses the information provided by the experts 
in documents published in the few years before and during the Baglihar dispute, 1999 – 2008. 
I aim to reflect upon my research questions by analyzing the values and interests that are most 
apparent in the texts
39
  
In this text analysis, published documents by Indian water experts are given status as 
primary source material. The documents are compared with each other and I look for key 
terms in the texts, such as: hydropolitics, water conflict or water cooperation, water scarcity, 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) or integrated/joint management.  
The documents were written in English by Indian scholars. Most of these Indians are 
based in India, and primarily New Delhi, but a few of them are working for academic 
institutes in other countries. The documents are analyzed in almost chronological order. The 
case study has been divided into two chapters, the first accounts for the years before Pakistan 
asked the World Bank help mediate in the Baglihar dispute in 2005, and the second part 
accounts for the second face of the dispute, 2005 – 2008, when the question of solving the 
dispute was in the hands of a neutral expert. 
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Some of the experts claimed that they provided objective knowledge while others 
openly had a more pro-Indian approach. Some of the important Indian experts commenting on 
the Baglihar dispute had ties to the Indian government. Ramaswamy R. Iyer and B.G. 
Verghese were, and still are the foremost Indian experts on this subject. They have 
commented on the IWT before, under, and after the period this thesis. Verghese and Iyer have 
both written journal- and newspaper articles, and books with comments on water issues, the 
Indus basin, and the IWT.  The number of scholars which I have defined as Indian experts 
slowly grew between 1999 and 2008, and will according to Peter Mollinga, probably continue 
to expand, since water problems are likely to increase in the future.
40
 
According to Aksel Tjora, a document analysis should first of all put the documents in 
their immediate context: who wrote them, where were they written, when were they written, 
who were the intended audience, and what was the purpose of writing the document?
41
 





(ii) Media analysis – Indian newspapers 
The importance of the Baglihar dispute is supported by the media coverage in the period. In 
order to examine the attention toward the Indus Basin hydropolitics in India, the top three 
English language newspapers were examined quantitatively from 1999 till 2008. The study of 
newspaper articles is used to help establish a chronology and examine what the media focused 
on during the Baglihar dispute. The Indian water experts often responded to speculation about 
water conflict in the media, and I analyze the newspaper articles in order to establish a 




According to the Indian Readership Survey for 2007, the English daily newspapers 
with most readers were the Times of India, Hindustan Times and the Hindu.
44
 The 
international newspaper database Factiva covers these newspapers in full text from 1998.
45
 I 
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have examined how many times these three newspapers mentioned the IWT from 1999 till 
2009 by searching in full text with the Boolean search phrase: "Indus Waters Treaty OR Indus 
Water Treaty".  The correct name of the treaty is Indus Waters Treaty, but the s in waters is 
often dropped. I cross-checked the possibility that the newspapers wrote articles concerning 
the IWT without typing the full name. I searched for the terms Baglihar, and Permanent Indus 




The IWT was mentioned 257 times in English medium print between 1 January 1999 and 31st 
December 2002. 151 of these articles were published in 2002. Compared to frequency in later 
years, especially 2005 and 2008-9, these are small numbers. About half of the articles could 
be found in the top 3 Indian English language newspapers, The Hindu, Hindustan Times, The 
Times of India, or the news agency Press trust of India. Some of the articles which mentioned 
the IWT in this period focused mainly on Indo-Pakistani diplomacy where the IWT was 
briefly mentioned. About 90% of the articles examined from the three newspapers dealt with 
the Baglihar dispute. 
 The newspaper articles were also examined in order to find out when, and in which 
newspapers Indian experts' articles were published. The sources in group one, the documents 
written by experts, is overlapping the sources in group two, the newspaper articles. 
 
(iii) Field research 
Historians should seek to understand the period of time in the past they are studying based on 
the premises of that period, as far as it is possible. My approach to understanding Indus Basin 
hydropolitics has been hermeneutical. I started out with a topic and a few assumptions, and 
began analyzing the source material I have described above. In order to better understand the 
sources and their context I went to New Delhi, where much of my source material had been 
produced. 
The IWT in newspapers: 1999-2008. (Stats from Factiva) 
Newspaper 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Sum 
The Hindu 9 1 5 19 23 13 58 9 18 13 168 
Hindustan Times 1 0 0 13 4 22 162 27 9 1 239 
Times of India 2 5 14 14 15 7 21 3 9 2 92 
Sum 12 6 19 46 42 42 241 39 36 16 499 
Other (world) 12 15 32 105 71 183 660 154 155 345 1732 
Total 24 21 51 151 113 225 901 193 191 361 2231 
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I got an internship as a researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS).  
The IPCS is an independent institute that conducts research on South Asian security.
46
 I 
worked there for almost four months, January - April 2011. In New Delhi, I combined the role 
as an insider who was a part of the faculty of researchers and living together with my one of 
my colleagues, but also as an outsider in the sense that I was there for a limited time and 
being relatively passive in the decisions and actions taken at the work place.
47
 The aim of this 
method of research was to gain familiarity with the practices of the occupational group of 
individuals whose texts I analyze. This was early in the research process, and my presence 
and my participation in dialogues influenced my approach in this thesis.  
Much of the time at IPCS was spent arranging seminars, conferences and other 
arrangements in collaboration with other think-tanks, institutes, embassies and high-ranking 
scholars. In addition to the events we arranged, I attended other seminars and conferences on 
water, energy, and climate change, arranged by other research institutes. Journalists from 
Indian newspapers were present at some of these conferences and seminars, and reporters 
often contacted different researchers at IPCS, to get their opinions and policy analysis on 
current affairs. The researchers at IPCS wrote several articles that were published in Indian 
newspapers – another example of overlap in my groups of source material. 
I interacted with some of the scholars that have produced the source material in this 
thesis, thus with other academics interested in the Indus Basin and water politics. The director 
of IPCS during my time there, Suba Chandran, has written extensively on issues related to the 
Indus Basin, but mostly after the period analyzed in this thesis.  
I learned that many scholars were interested in researching hydropolitical issues, but 
were bound to spend most of their time working on issues in nuclear security. It was much 
easier to get funding for research on nuclear proliferation than water issues. 
 This thesis analyzes the Indian side of a bilateral dispute, and I have only studied and 
interacted with the Indian side of a debate that tend to be polarized. Thus, my interaction with 
the Indian side only, may have affected my views.  
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Previous research  
There is little research on Indus Basin hydropolitics and the Baglihar dispute which utilizes 
the same approach as in this thesis. Research conducted is either performed by international 
relations experts or natural scientists with engineering or biological expertise. Most scholars 




 Work done by Indian experts is a part of the source material analyzed, but also a part 
of “previous research”. There is no clear division between these two. A few of the texts I have 
analyzed as primary source material briefly dealt with the Indian experts’ perspectives on 




One of the more useful studies in relation to this thesis is a research project carried out 
by the Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in collaboration with Lahore 
University. They argued that Pakistan and India have balanced between conflict and 
cooperation over water during the Baglihar dispute, and that “the decisions of both 
governments are made against a background of imperfect knowledge about the intentions and 
capabilities of the other.”50 Their research project on Indus Basin hydropolitics also analyzed 
the water crisis rhetoric in Pakistani and Indian media in 2010. They found that there had been 
a securitization of the Indus discourse.  
The term securitization was introduced by Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen school in 
the mid-1990s:  
 
In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized 
(meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of 
public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public 
policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some 
other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as 
an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the 
normal bounds of politics procedure).
51
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In short, securitization of the Indus discourse means that water management in the Indus 
Basin is increasingly treated as a national security concern. The ORF-Lahore study also found 
that criticism of the IWT had “been relatively moderate and sober in the media space”, in the 
two periods they studied, during the spring and winter months of 2012.
52
 Suba Chandran’s 
articles on Indus Basin hydropolitics have also been useful, and he agrees with the ORF-
Lahore study, that the water rhetoric needs to be de-securitized.
53
 
 There are several books and articles focusing on the mediation process in the 1950s, 
but these have first of all been relevant in order to understand the relevant historical 
background.
54
 Aloys Michel has given a thorough examination of the mediation process and 
explained that David Lilienthal, one of the initiators of the treaty, argued that India and 
Pakistan should ideally have managed the Indus River system jointly.  
Bashir Malik’s book Indus Waters Treaty in retrospect provides one the few Pakistani 
perspectives on the history of the IWT. He is critical towards the provisions of the IWT, 
calling them unjust to Pakistan. Malik gives special attention to the negotiation process, 
arguing that the Indian Prime Minister at that time, Jawaharlal Nehru, paid more attention to 
the Indus Basin hydropolitics than the Pakistani rulers during the negotiations, and thereby 
secured a better deal for India. Josef Korbel on the other hand, has argued that the economic 
threat of India’s controlling the headwaters of the Indus Rivers “was highly important in the 
minds of the Pakistani leaders”.55 
 South African and former UN representative on water issues in South Asia, John 
Briscoe, has criticized the dominant Indian perspective on Indus Basin hydropolitics. He 
argues that India to some extent ignores the critical situation in Pakistan. Briscoe has 
suggested that Indians could be more transparent with their data on river-flood at their dams, 
and that this could benefit both nations.
56
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Neda Zawahri has conducted research on different aspects of Indus Basin 
hydropolitics.
57
 She has stated that “[d]espite receiving many accolades for being the example 
of cooperation between adversarial states, India and Pakistan’s peaceful management of their 
Indus River system remains largely unexamined.”58 She has examined the role of the IWT and 
compared it with other treaties and found that there are elements in the IWT that have proven 
successful and could be used as a model in other treaties. She has also argued that India and 
Pakistan’s cooperation under the IWT has been active, not passive. She uses Keohane’s 
definition of active cooperation: it exists when states “adjust their behavior to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others.”59 Zawahri argues that “India and Pakistan have adjusted 
their behavior in accord with each other’s preferences and incurred losses in the process.”60 
Active or passive cooperation is not discussed in depth in this thesis, but it is relevant to the 
discussion on whether the IWT should be abrogated and renegotiated. Those who advocated 
renegotiation of the IWT argued that the new treaty should arrange for much more 
cooperation between India and Pakistan. 
Arun Elhance’s book Hydropolitics in the Third World has provided a useful insight in 
theory and case examples of transboundary river basin issues. The book examines six basins 
with many similarities to the Indus Basin, in terms of size, demography and economy. The 




 Terje Tvedt has written extensively on history of water. In his article on the discourse 
on water and hydropolitics in Water, Geopolitics and the world order,
62
 Tvedt argues that: 
 
In order to understand how the relationship between water, cooperation and power is 
played out in the real world, one has to analyse not only the hydrological character of 
the particular river system and how this develops over time, but also human 
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Analyzing “how different actors conceive the river” is in line with this thesis’ aim, i.e. how 
Indian experts conceive the Indus River.  
Brahma Chellaney thinks water is the world’s most underappreciated and undervalued 
commodity. Chellaney argues that South Asia's transboundary rivers are likely to cause 
tensions between states. According to Chellaney, water scarcity and economic growth cannot 
go hand in hand and he believes that if drastic acts are not implemented there will be inter-
state water conflict in Asia, and India and Pakistani are possible contestants.
64
 Robert G. 
Wirsing also recognizes water scarcity in transboundary river basins as a potential cause for 




In this section I outline the theoretical framework for this thesis. I examine the importance of 
water experts, and I place the approach of this thesis within intellectual history. Further, I 
describe a framework for how hydropolitics and water management are used in this thesis. 
Key terms such as water conflict and water cooperation, water scarcity and integrated water 
resources management (IWRM) and their mutual relations are explained.  
 
The importance of water experts  
The field is too new for there to be a body of literature on Indian experts’ debates about Indus 
Basin hydropolitics, but there is some literature on the role of water experts in a more general 
sense. Evers and Gerke describe experts as “a ‘knowledge elite’ who use knowledge that has 
been produced elsewhere in specifically defined contexts”.65  
This thesis makes use of Gooch and Stålnacke’s theory, that experts play an important 
role in providing policy makers with knowledge and information. The foremost scholar on 
Indus Basin hydropolitics, Ramaswamy R. Iyer, confirmed in a personal correspondence with 
me that experts’ role is important to the Indian water policy: 
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I have been writing extensively on India-Pakistan water relations and on the Indus 
Waters Treaty 1960. Whenever the water issue flares up between the two countries, 
the Ministries of External Affairs and Water Resources and even the Prime Minister 
call me in for consultations. I have a degree of readership in Pakistan too. I am an 
active participant in Track II initiatives between the two countries. 66 
 
 
He has also been asked to write articles by Pakistani newspapers, and has from time to time 
been consulted by the High Commission of India in Pakistan. 67 
Experts in general often claim to provide objective information, but their opinions are 
produced within a world of paradigms and they "are far from value free."
68
 Gooch and 
Stålnacke believe that the "special role of science and experts in water management calls for 
particular attention."
69
 The role of experts is special because they provide important 
knowledge and information, but they are not directly responsible for the consequences in the 
same manner as policy makers. 
Ken Conca points out that expert networks that provide information and pressure 
governments have been important for international environmental cooperation. This includes 
promoting "the creation of institutions for supranational environmental governance, including 
but not limited to treaty-based interstate regimes."
70
 
Information provided by experts has been important in the context of Indus Basin 
hydropolitics, where public and media opinion have been characterized by local, regional and 
national agendas rather than a holistic basin approach. BG Verghese has warned that the 
situation is a worrying: 
 
Because of lack of understanding and knowledge about the water issues […], various 
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Few scholars and institutes covered contemporary Indus Basin hydropolitical issues before the 
late 1990s. This changed during the Baglihar dispute. Since 1997, several research projects on 
water security have examined the past, present and future issues of the IWT.  Project reports 
and individual scholars have given recommendations on how to improve water management 
and keep the cooperation peaceful. Even though there has been an upsurge in research on 
hydropolitics since the 2000s, all is not well. Verghese said in 2011 that discourse on water 
often is driven by ideologies and myths which are perceived as truth. And these perceived 




In the words of the Indo-Pakistani research report Re-imagining the Indus, “de-
securitization of the discourse” is the key in order to establish cooperative management of the 
Indus River system, and that “interactions must be facilitated between journalists from both 
countries […] to produce counter-narratives centered on water management to take on the 
security centered narratives.”73 I would add that also experts are key actors in a process of 
desecuritizing. Peter Mollinga believes the debates about water resources in South Asia have 
been dichotomous and polarized: 
 
Critical and public perspectives have been pitted against mainstream and instrumental 
perspectives, with full effort on each side to delegitimize the opposition. Both poles 
run the risk of strategic essentialism, that is, the risk to translate the singular focus on 
'core' points in practical politics into single perspective, reductionist, frameworks of 
analysis. This no doubt reflects the intensity of the controversies and the high stakes 
involved, but also creates practical and discursive deadlocks, and underwrites 'winner 
takes it all politics'.
74,75 
 
During the Baglihar dispute, attempts at securitizing and de-securitizing the water discourse 
have played a role in the debates on Indus Basin hydropolitics. Securitization leads India and 
Pakistan to believe that their water resources must be protected, and that they are willing to 
risk conflict and war to secure the water. This can be described as “water nationalism”.76 
 




 "Re-Imagining the Indus,"  p. 6-7. 
74
 Mollinga, "Foreword," p. xv.  
75
 Spivak introduced the concept strategic essentialism, but has later expressed regret with how the concept has 
been used. Dourish defines strategic essentialism as “the ways in which subordinate or marginalized social 
groups may temporarily put aside local differences in order to forge a sense of collective identity through which 
they band together in political movements”; Paul Dourish, "Points of Persuasion: Strategic Essentialism and 
Environmental Sustainability" (paper presented at the Persuasive Pervasive Technology and Environmental 
Sustainability, Workshop at Pervasive, 2008). 
76




The approach in this thesis can be described as intellectual history. Intellectual history refers 
to the study of intellectuals and intellectual patterns over time, primarily in written form. It 
seeks to understand the ideas of the past within their context.  
The rise of intellectual history coincided with the enlightenment and Dutch classical 
scholar G.J. Vossius spoke about a historia literaria defined as “the lives and writings of 
learned men and the invention and progress of the arts.”77 It has roots in history of ideas, and 
in some definitions it is practically the same thing.
 78
 Arthur O. Lovejoy listed the disciplines 
that defined the limits of the history of ideas, but these could just as well be limits for 
intellectual history.
 79
 Most intellectual history denies, unlike history of ideas, that “an idea 
can be defined in the absence of the world”.80  Annabel Brett says that “intellectual history 
has come a long way from the isolated study of the ‘great ideas’ of ‘great thinkers’: that is, 
history of human thought or thinking as distinct from human action or doings.”81  
Brett identifies two paths intellectual history has taken in recent decades, of which 
“the study of language or discourse and its relation to human action and agency” is the 
relevant one in this thesis.
82
 Brett writes, “we can only know what an author was doing in 
writing a particular text if we know the circumstances of that doing.”83  This results in a, 
 
method which argues that to understand texts for the specific speech acts that they are, 
we need to understand the historical context in which they were uttered. … ‘context’ 




In my case the context is the Indus Basin hydropolitics during the Baglihar dispute. A part of 
this context is the linguistic context – what other people were saying at the time and the 
conventions governing that saying.
85
 I am particularly interested in the contemporary debates 
on transboundary water management and transboundary conflict and cooperation. The first 
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was dominated by a recent shift towards an IWRM-paradigm, while the other was 
characterized by studies that repudiate the water war prophesies.  
The intellectual history applied in this thesis has more in common with cultural 
history, and as Professor Peter E. Gordon describes it, “the line between intellectual history 
and cultural history is not always easily discerned”.86 This thesis is mainly interested in the 
intellectual elite, the Indian water experts, while cultural historians are more interested in 
public discourse. The difference between these two is not necessarily clear. 
Writing the history of a river could be an attempt at environmental history. 
Environmental historians are interested in the interaction between people and nature over 
time. According to Samuel P. Hays, an environmental historian aims to “chart the growing 
numbers of people and the way they use the environment, and … to examine the changes in 
that environment that have resulted from this human load.”87 This thesis examines Indian 
water experts’ attitude towards the Indian policy in the Indus Basin, which certainly affects 
the environment. The main focus however, is on the attitudes of people, not the changes in 
nature over time.  
 
What is hydropolitics? 
This thesis uses Elhance’s definition of hydropolitics, ”The systematic study of conflict and 
cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders.”88 The 
usage of water conflict in this thesis refers to interstate violent conflict. But in the specific 
case of this thesis, it is necessary to add an aspect to the definition of hydropolitics. As 
explained earlier, this thesis analyzes how Indian experts participated in debates on 
hydropolitics, and thereby constituting to the overall Baglihar dispute. These debates are a 
form of conflict management process, and therefore a part of the hydropolitics of the Indus 
Basin. Successful conflict management would be that the partners did not take recourse to 
violence. 
There have been several incidents of water conflict around the world, but these have 
been intrastate and non-violent. Mohan has stated that “conflicts over water have steadily 
increased” in South Asia, but the conflicts they refer to are typically conflicts between local 
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farmers protesting against large dams or, or conflict between local communities caused by 
perceived inequality in intrastate water sharing.
89
  
The prophecy that scarcity of water in transboundary rivers would lead to water 
conflict was popular in the 1980s and 1990s, both in academic writing and elsewhere.
90
 In 
1993, Peter Gleick argued that:  
 
The maldistribution of fresh water together with current trends in population and 
development suggest that water is going to be an increasingly salient element of 




Gleick pointed out four links between water and conflict: Water as political and military goal, 
water as a weapon of war, water resources infrastructure as a target of war, and conflict that 
may arise from disputes over inequities in water distribution and management.
92
 Serageldin 
statement on the link between water and war
93
 was reiterated by former Secretary-General of 
UN Kofi Annan in 2001, who said that “[f]ierce competition for fresh water may well become 




Competition over natural resources as one of several root causes for modern warfare is 
not a new idea, but according to a paper by Gleditsch and Diehl in 2001, "it was not until the 
recent emergence of environmental issues on the international political agenda that more 
specific claims about environmental disruption and violent conflict emerged."
96
 Gleditsch and 
Diehl emphasized that rivers know no borders, and this implies a potential for water related 
dispute.  
The main criticism towards the water war literature has been its lack of empirical 
support. From the mid-1990s several scholars, and especially Professor of Geography, Aaron 
T. Wolf, have argued that shared water resources will rather be a catalyst for cooperation 
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 Wolf accompanied by Yoffe and Giordano analyzed 1,831 interstate water-
issues between 1946 and 1999 and found that only 37 were violent. Fully 414 of the 507 of 
the cases were "conflictual" but most of these could be classified as “rhetorical hostility”.98 
However, even though history suggests that there have been few violent water 
conflicts and no water wars; most scholars recognize the likelihood of future water conflicts. 
This is grounded in the complexity of water issues, and that it is an essential resource. Wolf 
and Amery believe that "political boundaries often ignore this critical resource, and because 
water flows vary in space and time, disputes are bound to arise …"99 Elhance agrees that the 
complexity of transboundary rivers needs special attention if conflict shall be avoided: 
 
If the international community is to help prevent the emergence of acute conflicts 
among the states and peoples sharing transboundary water resources, it needs to 
acquire a much more sophisticated understanding of hydropolitics. (…) the attainment 
of sustainable economic development, environmental well-being, human security, and 
human rights in large parts of the world is not possible without cooperation among 




Transboundary rivers are a special challenge for water management as they involve 
cooperation between two (or more) different sovereign states, each with their own legal 
system and institutions. In some cases, such as the Indus River, they may also straddle 
between two different political systems. This complicates the cooperation necessary for 
efficient water management. Terje Tvedt has criticized the theory of linkages between water 
scarcity and cooperation or conflict, asserting that it is deterministic and simplistic.
101
 
India and Pakistan cooperate on water sharing according to the provisions of the IWT. 
But one of the big questions during the Baglihar dispute was whether the IWT was adequate 
to prevent conflict. It could not prevent disputes to arise, and disagreements over the Indus 
River system were increasing between India and Pakistan. Indus Basin hydropolitics during 
the Baglihar dispute are examined in the context of Arun Elhance’s argument that if nation 
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states are unwilling to cooperate and manage the transboundary rivers in a sustainable and 
equitable manner, “the potential for acute (violent) conflict over water … will keep 
growing.”102 
 
Water scarcity in the Indus Basin 
While, successful conflict management was defined as when the partners managed to avoid 
violent conflict, the success of the Indian experts did also depend on the management of the 
water resources in the river basin. The Baglihar dispute was a part of a trend of on-going 
tension in the water sharing relations between India and Pakistan. This trend was partly 
caused by the increased water scarcity in the Indus Basin. Elhance defines water scarcity as “a 
lack of secure, uninterrupted, and long-term availability of adequate amounts of freshwater, of 
required quality, on a regular basis, and for multiple needs.”103 This thesis views the water 
scarcity both in neo-Malthusian notion that population rise leads to resource scarcity, but also 
that water scarcity is caused by inefficient and unsustainable water management.  
Since the 1950s, freshwater availability per capita in India has decreased by nearly 
60% and research reports argue that it will continue to decline in the next decades. According 
to some definitions India is already on the verge of being labeled as ‘water stressed’ (below 
an average of 1700 m
3
 available freshwater per person per year). Pakistan has been water 
stressed according to this definition for many years and is close to facing “water scarcity” 
which is below an average of 1000m
3
 of water per person per year.
104
  In addition to the 
uncertainties caused by decreased freshwater availability per capita, climate change 




Although the water expert at Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, BG Verghese, 
has stated that “India has proceeded to harness its water resources with a growing 
measure of environmental discipline,”106 a number of other water experts fear that 
India is facing a water crisis in the future.
107
 In 2012, India’s population growth rate 
                                                 
102
 Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World : conflict and cooperation in international river basins, p. 3. 
103
 Ibid., 4. 
104
 Archer et al., "Sustainability of water resources management in the Indus Basin under changing climatic and 
socio economic conditions.", 
And the Aquastat database from Food and Agriculture organization 
105
 Ramaswamy R. Iyer, "Indus Treaty: A Different View," Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 29 (2005); 
Verghese, "Political Fuss Over The Indus." 
106
 "Ideology threatens Indus Treaty," The South Asian Journal (2010). 
107
 See for example Gitanjali Bakshi and Sahiba Trivedi, The Indus Equation  (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight 
Group, 2011).; Robert G. Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro, "River rivalry: water disputes, resource insecurity 
and diplomatic deadlock in South Asia," Water Policy 9, no. 3 (2007).; Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Towards water 
29 
 
was 1.312%, and the demand for fresh water in India will therefore probably 
increase.
108
 Further economic development and urbanization can contribute to the 
declining availability per capita.
109
 India’s National Commission on Water reported in 
1999 that by 2050, India’s annual water per capita average will fall below 1000m3.110  
 
Thus, there are two different ways of interpreting the causes of the crisis of water. scarcity in 
the Indus Basin. Many politicians will define it as a crisis of availability, while it would 
perhaps be more precise to define it as a crisis of management, or mismanagement.
111
 Those 
who view the situation as a crisis of availability believe there is enough water in the Indus 
River system for everyone, if it is just utilized to its full potential. The solution to prevent the 
crisis, according to this perspective, might include constructing big reservoirs and canals to 
divert and link rivers. The argument that river-water running into the ocean is wasted water, 
can sometimes be heard, even though it was more common in earlier decades.
112
 The other 
way is to treat the issue of scarcity in the Indus Basin as a crisis of mismanagement. The 
mismanagement of water resources has an enormous environmental impact. There are 
considerable problems of sedimentation, waterlogging, salinization in the Indus plains, and 
problems connected to less freshwater in the Indus delta.  
 The world’s largest contiguous irrigation system can be found in the Indus Basin, and 
irrigation is by far the largest user of basin water (constituting over 90% of total 
withdrawal).
113
 According to Ramaswamy R. Iyer the irrigation system is not operated 
effectively by international standards, and maintenance of it is poor. A report from 2000 
stated that irrigation canals in the Indus Basis lose up to 40% of the water due to seepage,
114
 
and Iyer has stated that there are “serious equity issues in the operation of major/medium 
irrigation projects.”115 According to Peter Mollinga, food production could be doubled in 
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River basin water management 
In the following, I outline the recent development within water management research, in 
which the concept of IWRM has had a hegemonic status since the 1990s. 
Before the 1970s, the field of water resources studies had mostly been occupied by 
natural science scholars such as hydrologists and water resources engineers.
117
 From the 
1970s this situation slowly changed, when a global network of water professionals started to 
develop. This network consisted of scholars not only from natural science disciplines, but 
from a various range of social sciences which developed expertise in issues of water. The UN 
Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 1977 can be viewed as a starting point. The 
conference themes were narrow and discussions were mainly about safe drinking water and 
sanitation. Attempts to discuss transboundary cooperation were problematic because of the 
implications for states’ sovereignty over natural resources.118 In the 1980s and 1990s the 
international water expert network developed through organizations and forums, into 
becoming a force that would legitimatize water resources as an important and complex cross-
disciplinary field of study. Ken Conca writes that alongside the growth of the water expert 
networks since the 1970s, a corresponding "idea of integrated water resources management 
has emerged to offer a new paradigm for water-related decisions and practices."
119
 Conca 
believes an evidence of the joint success of the idea of IWRM and the development of the 
water expert network was "the near-hegemony that IWRM phrases and concept had come to 
enjoy by the late 1990s as the language of international water policy."
120
  
The paradigm shift towards a new thinking with an IWRM framework as a central 
element has been described by Peter Gleick.
121
 An idea of managing water resources based on 
IWRM-principles was also apparent among the experts providing analysis on the Indus 
Waters. But what are the basic principles of IWRM? First of all it recognizes the complex 
range of uses of water, and it advocates a cross-sectorial integrated planning involving actors 
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and institutions at local, national and transnational levels.
122
 Global Water Partnership’s 
definition of IWRM is largely accepted:  
 
IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of 
water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 




Despite IWRM’s hegemonic status, it has been problematic to implement. Especially at 
transnational levels, since states are not likely to give up the sovereign claim to natural 
resources. When Pakistan and India signed the IWT, they decided to divide the water 
resources instead of sharing them. The paradigm shift towards an understanding that IWRM-
principles are necessary for improved water management has made the provisions of the IWT 
outdated. To deal with increasing water scarcity, experts have argued that India and Pakistan 
need to improve their water management that requires further cooperation.  
There have been a paradigm shift in the water resources scholarship since the 1970s, 
but the IWT has remained unchanged. Suba Chandran has written that the IWT was “signed 
in 1960, almost fifty years back, in a different political, economic, demographic, ecological 
and energy environment. Today there has been a considerable change in all these five 
areas”.124 But even though the IWT has been viewed as outdated by some scholars, most 
scholars recognize that the IWT has helped India and Pakistan to cooperate peacefully on the 
Indus River system. The discussion on whether India and Pakistan can implement IWRM-
principles in the Indus Basin is therefore interrelated with the discussion on whether how 
nations can cooperate on transboundary rivers and avoid conflict.  
 
Personal perspectives  
Indus Basin history is not very well known to the common Norwegian. If anyone has heard 
about it, it is a good chance it is through the books and TV-documentaries by Terje Tvedt. A 
certain distance to the field of study can be positive, especially when studying an issue in 
Indo-Pakistan relations. The reason behind my choice of research topic is not because I like to 
travel in India, or I am particularly fond of a South Asian culture. I am first of all interested in 
the question of sharing a transboundary river. The Indus Basin hydropolitics and the Baglihar 
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dispute made an interesting case study, because there is so much at stake, and it involves so 
many people. 
I have already described my field work, and recognized that my interaction with the 
Indian side may have affected my objectivity to one way or the other. I have tried to analyze 
Indian experts' attitude in an unbiased and impartial manner. But I recognize of course, in 
such a heated debate that some may try to put me in one category or another. In the preface of 
his book on the Indus Rivers in 1967, Aloys Michel wrote that: 
 
As any scholar must, I have tried to preserve impartially in evaluating the attitudes and 
positions of both nations in the struggle over Partition, in Kashmir, and in the Indus 
Waters Dispute. Unavoidably, some readers will feel that I have slighted India or 
Pakistan – or perhaps both.125 
 
British scholar, Undala Z. Alam, who wrote her Ph.D. about the Indus Basin, has family 
relations on both sides of the border. Although she aimed to be careful in how she worded 
things she has often been thought to be the “other” by both sides.126 I share both the goals and 
the concerns of Michel, but I also expect to be viewed as the other by both Indians and 
Pakistanis. 
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3. The Baglihar dispute: 1999-2004 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
In 1999, the same year Indo-Pakistani relations were at crisis because of the Kargil 
Conflict
127
, another important incident happened that did not grab the media's attention at that 
time.
128
 India decided to initiate construction of the Baglihar.
129
 However, since India kept 
information about the initiated construction a secret, Pakistan was not aware of it before 2001. 
This chapter clarifies the hydropolitical situation in the Indus Basin between 1998 and 2005 
and analyses the attitude of Indian water experts in this period. The chapter is divided in three 
chronological sections. 
The beginning of this chapter examines the hydropolitics of the Indus Basin in the late 
1990s, just before the Baglihar dispute. This period was characterized by tension and 
uncertainty in Indian-Pakistani relations. Both nations tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and in 
1999 they fought in the Kargil Conflict, and Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan 
through a coup d’état. Indo-Pakistani hydropolitics seemed to be at status quo, but there was 
tension between the Indian government and the state government of J&K. The Indian experts 
began identifying potential hydropolitical issues in the Indus Basin. 
 In the second part, 2001-2002, attention towards the IWT was growing. Critique 
towards the IWT in J&K increased, and terror attacks in India were linked with Indus Basin 
hydropolitics. Indian media and experts discussed whether India would violate or abrogate the 
IWT, and whether J&K’s interests were kept in view when India signed the treaty.  
 The last part of this chapter examines 2003 and 2004, when Baglihar negotiation 
stalled, and Pakistan warned that they might request the World Bank to interfere in the 
dispute. The attention towards the IWT was still present, but there were a slight decrease in 
scholarly texts written by Indian experts.  
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1999-2000: Dissatisfaction in Jammu and Kashmir 
In the late 1990s, Indo-Pakistani relations were on a roller-coaster ride. After both nations had 
tested nuclear weapons in 1998, there were signs of improvements in early 1999. Indian 
Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initiated the “bus 
diplomacy” in February 1999, marked by Vajpayee’s bus ride across the border on his way to 
bilateral talks in Lahore, discussing ways to improve relations.  
However, a few months later, Pakistani insurgents occupied Indian territory in Kargil, 
and India responded with air strikes. The Kargil Conflict almost turned into a war, but 
Pakistan withdrew their support to the insurgents in July 1999, after international pressure, 
and the conflict ended. Three months later, Pervez Musharraf, generally thought to be the one 
who planned the troop movements that led to the Kargil Conflict, seized power through a 
coup d’état in Pakistan. 
 At the same time policy makers in J&K expressed disappointment with the lack of 
investment from the Indian government in hydropower projects in the region. The Chief 
Minister Farooq Abdullah and other representatives complained that the IWT hindered 
development in J&K. India had to balance their Indus Basin policy, considering the IWT and 
their relations with Pakistan, but also the voices from J&K which began demanding rights to 
utilize the water resources within the state. 
 
Indus Basin hydropolitics around 1999 
The troubled Indus Basin hydropolitics did not begin with Baglihar. The Baglihar dispute 
resembled hydropolitical issues between India and Pakistan in the 1950s, 1970s and the 
1980s. As mentioned in the introduction, the Baglihar dispute reflects important aspects of the 
Indus River history and the Indo-Pakistani relations. However, the Baglihar dispute was 
special.  
The scarcity of water in the Indus Basin, and the linkages between water scarcity and 
water conflict in academic writing provided a context in which the Baglihar dispute could 
have led to inter-state violent conflict.
130
 Both nations were in possession of nuclear weapons 
and had just fought an armed border conflict in Kargil. Pakistan had been water stressed for 
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 Conflict over water in the Indus Basin was reckoned as a potential consequence of 
increasing water scarcity, but the IWT seemed to function well as a conflict mediator. 
However, the IWT was signed in another time when the availability of water per capita was 
much different. Former Foreign Secretary of India, Jagat S. Mehta, had estimated in 1988 that 
it might be necessary to scrap the IWT within 25 years because of the changing demography 
of the Indus Basin.
132
  
Even though water scarcity could serve as reason for conflict over water, there was no 
single Indus Basin hydropolitical issue that could turn into conflict in the late 1990s. India and 
Pakistan still disagreed sharply on the Tulbul Navigation Project,
133
 as they had done since the 
1980s, but dispute did not escalate further. 
However, from the late 1990s, policy makers in J&K began expressing their 
disappointment with the Indian government over the lack of investments in hydropower 
projects in the region. In 1998, Farooq Abdullah asked the Indian government to initiate the 
construction of Baglihar. It is within this context, that the Indian government secretly initiated 
the construction of Baglihar. Perhaps an appeasing move towards J&K, but a potential case 
for conflict with Pakistan.  
 
The design of Baglihar 
The purpose of Baglihar was to generate electricity and it was projected to be a run-of-the-
river hydropower plant with a capacity of 450MW.
134
 
India informed Pakistan about their plans for the Baglihar project in the early 1990s, 
but Pakistan made objections to the plans from the beginning.
135
 Pakistan at least wanted to 
inspect the construction site before they could possibly accept that India built the dam, but 
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India did not permit any inspection. Indian officials declared that there were no reason the 
Pakistani Indus Commissioner should inspect the site.
136
  
The Pakistani officials were particularly worried about the size of the pondage of the 
dam. The size of the pondage, or operating pool, is decided by the storage capacity, and the 
design and height of the sluice gates on the dam.
137
 According to the IWT, India is allowed to 
construct run-of-the-river projects on the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum, as long as the projects do 
not have more than a minimum of storage.
138
 A reservoir would enable India to stop the flow 
of the river while they filled the reservoir, and maneuverable sluice gates at a low level on the 
dam would enable India to flush out water from the reservoir. 
Baglihar was projected to be a run-of-the-river project with small storage capacity, but 
with hydraulic sluice gates, or gated spillways. A hydropower project with a reservoir can 
operate more efficiently, because they can store water in the reservoir during the night when 
the need for electricity is lower. The gated spillways enable flushing of water and silt. Silt- or 
sediment control is essential at hydropower projects on the Indus River system because the 
rivers carry high amounts of silt, which potentially can make hydroelectric projects inefficient 
in a few years if there is lack of sedimentation-control. 
Before Baglihar, the Salal project was the only hydroelectric project of considerable 
size India had constructed on the western rivers. Thus, there were few or no reasons for India 
to start a dispute over water. 
 
The IWT before 1999: an acceptable treaty 
Since there were few disputes over water before the late 1990s, the IWT and its Permanent 
Indus Commission (PIC) was perceived as an acceptable treaty that would enable India and 
Pakistan to cooperate over shared water resources. The Baglihar was an issue that the PIC 
would deal with. Indian water experts were not worried and suggested that the IWT could be 
used as a model for transboundary river treaties in other regions. The same view was present 
in much of the earlier research on Indus Basin hydropolitics, which mainly focused on the 
1950s and the treaty negotiations. The IWT had been an interesting research topic because it 
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proved that a functioning water treaty and diplomatic relations between two neighboring 
countries with a problematic relationship was possible. 
However, the IWT and the PIC had not settled the 15 year old disagreement over the 
projected Tulbul Navigation Project
139
 on the Wular Lake in India, and now India began 
constructing Baglihar without Pakistan’s permission. Could the PIC settle the Baglihar 
dispute, considering that they were unable to reach an agreement on the Tulbul Navigation 
Project? These questions were not asked before some years later. In 1999, the dissatisfaction 
in J&K was India’s main hydropolitical concern in the Indus Basin. 
 
Critique from Jammu and Kashmir  
In the Indian state J&K, where large parts of the Indus River system originate, newspapers 
reported critique towards the IWT from officials and politicians. In the J&K budget speech in 
1999, the state’s Finance Minister Muhammad Shafi referred to the treaty as “a nightmare” 
and that “the State of J&K needs to be compensated for the sacrifice it has to make in the 
national interest.”140 Critique towards the IWT in J&K was not an entirely new phenomenon, 
but the dissatisfaction with the IWT remained a minor issue in J&K politics for a long time. 
This changed when the Farooq Abdullah-led National Conference won 57 out of 87 seats in 
the state assembly elections in 1996. Muhammed Shafi stated in November 1996 that J&K 
should be “compensated since the state has been put to a great disadvantage by the Centre 
signing the Indus Water Treaty."
141
  Chief Minister of J&K, Farooq Abdullah, asked the 
Indian government to hand over ownership of two hydroelectric power plants to the state 
government in J&K. According to Abdullah, this would serve as compensation for the 
economic losses in J&K caused by the IWT.
142
 In an interview in 2000, Farooq Abdullah was 
asked why representatives from J&K just recently had uttered grievances against the IWT. 
Farooq Abdullah replied, “we have always been talking about it”, and that his father, Sheikh 
Mohammed Abdullah,
143
 often had informed the government in New Delhi about the 
disadvantages of the IWT.
144
 But Shafi’s speech in 1999 marked the beginning of more 
frequent critical statements reported in media from officials in J&K in the years that followed.  
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 The critique from J&K said that the IWT restrained that state government from 
constructing hydroelectric projects on the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The critique reached a 
voltage peak in the spring of 2002 when the J&K Legislative Assembly called for a review of 
the IWT,
145
 and elected members from the National Conference, the Bhartiya Janata Party, 
and Communist Party of India all denounced the IWT.
146 
 
 The dissatisfaction in J&K and the initiation of Baglihar must be seen as the most 
important hydropolitical events in 1999 and 2000. However, the critique from J&K was 
almost totally ignored by the IWT experts in the same period. It was not before late 2001 and 
spring 2002, that Indian experts recognized the importance of the policy makers in J&K. This 
will be examined in the second part of this chapter. 
 
The Indian experts 
In the late 1990s, Indian experts focused on the mediation process of the treaty (1950s) and 
they discussed how to improve water management in South Asia. The dominating attitude 
was that the IWT had functioned satisfactory, but that it might need improvements in the near 
future in order to prepare for enhanced water management in the Indus Basin.  
Between 1999 and 2000 there were three articles written by Indian experts that 
discussed Indus Basin hydropolitics.
147
 Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Asit K. Biswas and Ashok 
Swain wrote relevant journal articles,
148
 and I am also including an article by BG Verghese 
from 1997.
149
 His utterances can be put in much of the same categories as those of the three 
other authors. 
 None of the four articles was written mainly about Indus Basin hydropolitics. The 
experts mentioned IWT in a general discussion on transboundary river issues, as a model for 
cooperation. According to Iyer, Biswas and Verghese, the IWT had functioned well as a 
conflict resolution in the Indus Basin since 1960. Indian water expert at the Department of 
Peace and Conﬂict Research in Uppsala University, Ashok Swain, was less positive, but none 
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of the experts discussed the Indus Basin in depth. Iyer and Verghese were more concerned at 




Founder of the Third World Centre for Water Management in Mexico, Asit K. Biswas, 
dealt with the role of third parties in water treaties, and argued that the World Bank played a 
successful role as a mediator when the IWT was negotiated. Biswas pointed out that the IWT 
was “a mutually acceptable agreement between the two countries on the sharing of the waters 
of the Indus River system.”151  
A focus on the negotiating process and the early years of the IWT can be found in the 
articles of all four authors. This focus was in accordance with much of the earlier research on 
the IWT, which thus far had been devoted to the negotiations and the role of the World Bank 
as a mediator.
152
 1948-1960 was a period of conflict and tension in the Indus Basin and 
attention towards conflict has characterized much of the research on the Indus Basin 
hydropolitics.  
Around 2000 there was a growing concern that water scarcity in the region could lead 
to new tension and conflict over freshwater resources. Therefore, focus shifted gradually from 
attention towards the early years, to the then present and future issues. This perspective was 
most evident in Verghese’s article from 1997 and Swain’s article from 2001. They warned 
that water management and cooperation perhaps needed to be improved to avoid conflict and 
war over water.  
Was the Indus Waters Treaty outdated? 
The fear of a conflict over water in the Indus Basin was grounded on two ideas. First, the 
theory that competition over scarce water resources in transboundary river basin would lead to 
conflict.
153
 Secondly, that the IWT and the PIC, the instance and institution that had created 
peaceful cooperation in the Indus Basin, was an outdated and far from optimal treaty when it 
came to sustainable water management.   
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 The dominant position argued that IWT had been successful the first 30 or 40 years, 
but Indian experts speculated whether the IWT might not stand the test of time. Iyer stated 
that the treaty had “been working reasonably well despite a difficult political relationship 
between the two countries”.154 The then present issues did not worry Iyer. He described the 
disagreement in the 1970s over the Salal hydroelectric project as an important dispute, but 
emphasized that it was resolved peacefully according to the IWT provisions. Iyer asserted that 
the disagreement over the Tulbul Navigation Project was nothing to worry about, stating that 
“there is no reason to believe that agreement will not eventually be reached.”155 Later, in 
2002, Iyer changed this optimistic view. The change towards a more negative view will be 
dealt with later in this chapter. 
Iyer described the water sharing under treaty as “quite simple.”156 The IWT had 
merely bisected the whole river basin into two different segments managed unilateral. This 
was far from optimal according to the IWRM-paradigm which had become dominant in water 
management discourse in the 1990s. As defined in chapter two, this thesis uses Global Water 
Partnership’s definition of IWRM.157 
Basing his ideas on IWRM-principles, Ashok Swain went further than Iyer in his 
critique of the IWT. Swain said the treaty was only a limited solution and that the treaty 
needed improvement. He argued that the objective of the IWT was to solve a water scarcity 
problem in the 1950s but that the treaty had not considered the issues which later became 
apparent, in the 1990s and 2000s. However, contrary to what Swain suggested, the Indus 
Basin region was not viewed as water scarce in the 1950s, and that the IWT-negotiations first 
of all aimed to reach an equitable solution both countries could agree upon, safeguarding both 
countries need for a stable and reliable amount of water.
158
 The then Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru also optimistically hoped that the IWT could have led to a solution of the 
Kashmir dispute.
159
 The region was seen as rich on water resources, which both countries 
could exploit further.
160
 Despite this, Swain stated that: 
 
Signing of a sharing agreement might solve the water scarcity problem for a short 
period of time, but it does not provide a long-term solution. The recent threats to 
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the survival of the Indus River Agreement of 1960 […] confirm this apprehension.161  
 
Swain did not define what a long-term solution is, but the IWT had functioned for 40 years at 
that time, it had never been violated, and it was still unchanged and functioning. While Swain 
argued that India should consider renegotiation of the IWT, Ramaswamy R. Iyer advocated 
that the IWT should be kept.  
 
A new treaty based on IWRM-principles? 
Assuming that the IWT was outdated and that it could not prevent conflict over water in the 
future, Swain presented a list of recommendations for enhancing cooperation. These 
suggestions were based on the main IWRM-principle: “coordinated development and 
management of water”, i.e. river basins should be managed as single units, and management 
of transboundary rivers not should be split up on the basis of political boundaries. Freshwater 
binds land areas together and if rivers are divided between countries, interference at one place 
in the river basin will have consequences for other riparian countries. Most often the 
consequences of the interference will be negative.
162
 While Swain argued that an IWRM-
approach could enhance and optimize the management of the Indus River system, Iyer, 




 Verghese suggested that if India and Pakistan wanted to deal with the looming water 
crisis in the Indus Basin, the IWT should be renegotiated into an 'Indus-II'. A more 
cooperative Indus treaty could, according to Verghese, optimize the utilization of the water 
resources in J&K. More cooperation, or joint management, is perhaps the foremost principle 
of an IWRM regime. However, it is difficult to implement IWRM in river basin with one or 
more states. 
Verghese therefore noted that improved Indo-Pakistani relations would be necessary 
to achieve more cooperation under an Indus-II. The Kargil Conflict in 1999 and terror attacks 
in India in 2001 were the opposite of what Verghese hoped for. Despite troubled Indo-
Pakistani relations, Verghese did not give up his idea of an Indus-II. This will be clarified 
later in this thesis.  
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Another interesting aspect of Verghese’s idea of an Indus-II was that he was the only 
Indian expert between 1997 and 2001 that explicitly mentioned J&K in connection to Indus 
Basin hydropolitics, despite that this period was characterized by a number of IWT-critical 
statements from policy makers in J&K.   
 
Cooperative water sharing in the Indus Basin 
Most Indian experts agreed that the IWT and the PIC managed to keep the water sharing 
between India and Pakistan peaceful. Therefore, most agreed, it was an acceptable and partly 
successful treaty. However, most experts also agreed that the treaty was far from optimal in 
terms of water management. 
Ramaswamy Iyer described the water sharing under the IWT as “quite simple”. 
Simplicity is not merely a negative attribute. Iyer did not elaborate on the negative aspects of 
the simplicity in 1999,
164
 but argued that the PIC had worked well because it had a simple job: 
to monitor the implementation of a simple treaty: 
 
As we have seen, the Indus Treaty finally allocates some rivers as a whole to Pakistan 
and others to India, and does not allocate shares in the same river. Thus, there is no 





Iyer wrote that the PIC had worked reasonably well, but that their task was not difficult 
compared to the tasks of for instance the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission under the 
Ganga Treaty.  
“No continuing process of water-sharing” could be interpreted as little or passive 
cooperation between India and Pakistan. Zawahri has criticized three Indian experts: Jagat S. 
Mehta, Ramaswamy R. Iyer and BG Verghese for describing the India and Pakistan’s 
cooperation on water as passive. Mehta, Iyer and Verghese have argued that ideally, 
cooperation over water in the Indus Basin should have included a basin-wise water 
management planning. According the IWRM-principles, joint management is necessary to 
implement enhanced water management in the Indus Basin. Since India and Pakistan never 
have cooperated in such a manner, their cooperation could be described as passive.  
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However, according to Conca, it is questionable whether any further cooperation is 
realistic because of the implications for states’ sovereignty over natural resources.166 Zawahri 
agreed with Conca, arguing that India and Pakistan’s cooperation on water was as good as it 
could get: 
 
Generally, states are less likely to accept an integrated approach because it impinges 
on their political sovereignty and the amount of cooperation required to arrive at an 




Zawahri uses Keohane’s definition of active cooperation: it exists when “states adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.”168 According to Zawahri, the 
cooperation had been active because “India and Pakistan have adjusted their behavior in 
accord with each other’s preferences and incurred losses in the process.”169 Zawahri used a 
definition of active cooperation that required states to incur some losses in the process of 
adjusting their behavior.
170
 If this reasoning is to be followed, any further cooperation 
between India and Pakistan is unrealistic. A few of the Indian experts however, mentioned 
enhanced cooperation as a possibility.  
Mehta, Verghese and Iyer all agreed that the treaty was a triumph of conflict 
resolution, but that it did not arrange for optimal water management. Zawahri put their 
attitudes within the same category, but there more differences between the three Indian water 
experts than Zawahri asserted. 
Former Foreign Secretary of India, Jagat S. Mehta, argued in an article in 1988 that 
the IWT was a suboptimal success.
171
 He proposed that joint management of the Indus Basin 
was the key to optimization of water resources in the region. Further, he criticized the role of 
the two Indus Commissioners, stating that these professional engineers “must not be allowed 
to dominate and determine the strategy or inhibit broader and long-term goals.”172 Mehta 
wrote that the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan could, and should, have played more 
important roles in Indo-Pakistani water cooperation instead of the two Indus Commissioners 
(who are professional engineers). According to Mehta, this would make the PIC more 
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effective because the Foreign Secretaries were more likely to make “enlightened and bolder 
decisions,”173 than the commissioners. He exemplified that this had been the case when he 




In 1988, when Mehta wrote this article, the Salal dam had just been commissioned. 
Today, Mehta’s so called ‘enlightenment’ can be criticized because the Salal dam has 
experienced huge problems of sedimentation, partly caused by modifications to the design 
which Mehta accepted. This has decreased the power generating capacity and the life 
expectancy of the dam.  
Mehta’s perspective towards the roles of the Indus Commission separated him 
especially from Ramaswamy Iyer who argued that the commission was a well-functioning 
tool in Indus Basin hydropolitics. Iyer argued that in comparison with the Indo-Bangladesh 
Joint River Commission, the PIC functioned far better. First of all because the PIC had a less 
complicated task than the Joint River Commission, i.e. the PIC “merely had to monitor the 
implementation of the treaty”.175  While Mehta hoped to replace the engineers as Indus 
Commissioners because of their rigidity in for example the Salal dispute, Iyer had a different 
perspective:  
 
The Indus commissioners meet regularly in either country, and the working 
relationship between the engineers at the commission level is very cordial. Differences 





Zawahri’s decision to juxtapose Iyer’s and Mehta’s attitude towards the cooperation is a 
simplification, and although Iyer ideally would have wanted joint cooperation, he did not 
define the cooperation as passive.  
Verghese’s classification of the cooperation was more in tune with how Zawahri had 
labeled him. Verghese wrote that the IWT was not optimal for providing drainage, storage or 
energy, and that the cooperation needed to be improved to avoid conflict and war over 
water.
177
 Zawahri had put the three Indian experts in the same category, but there were 
considerable differences, especially between Mehta’s and Iyer’s view. 
 










 Verghese, "Water conflicts in South Asia." 
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2001-2002 Water as a weapon – abrogating the IWT?  
In 1999, Indo-Pakistani relations were in a crisis because of the Kargil Conflict. Two years 
later, terror attacks in Srinagar on the 1st of October and in Delhi the 13th December caused a 
new downturn in Indo-Pakistani relations. India mobilized a great number of troops at the 
border from December 2001 till October 2002 to prevent cross-border terrorism.
178
 There 




The continued IWT-criticism in J&K and the link between the terror attacks and the 
IWT caused a great deal of attention to Indus Basin hydropolitics in Indian media. Indian 
experts discussed whether India would violate or abrogate the IWT, and whether J&K’s 
interests were kept in view when India signed the treaty. 
 
Indus Basin hydropolitics 2001 
On the 30
th
 of May 2001, the PIC held their annual meeting, discussing the issues of concern 
under the treaty. These concerns were mainly related to information on water statistic during 
flood season, but Pakistan also raised a question about Baglihar. India informed Pakistan that 
Baglihar was constructed according to the provisions of the IWT. Since Baglihar was not on 
the agenda for the meeting, the PIC decided that the discussion would be continued at the next 
meeting, which was planned to be held one year later.
180
 But long before a year had passed, 
the very existence of the IWT was questioned, and there was doubt whether the PIC would 
meet in 2002. It was now clear that India had begun constructing Baglihar, but there seemed 
to be little correspondence on the issue. Did this imply that India acted unilaterally, in conflict 
with the IWT? 
 After the terror attacks against the Parliament of India in New Delhi 13 December 
2001, tensions between India and Pakistan were high. India claimed that Pakistan was 
responsible for the attack, and Indian government representatives stated that “nuclear-capable 
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missiles were in position to strike Pakistan“.181 In two newspaper articles from December 
2001, Parul Chandra asked whether India would violate the IWT, and reported that 
“speculation is rife on the issue”.182 
In addition to the tension after the terror attacks, the speculation regarding the 
violation was rooted in India’s need to release large amount of water and silt from the Salal 
hydro plant. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Salal hydro plant was constructed on the 
Chenab River and commissioned in 1988. It soon lost its efficiency due to siltation. After 
lengthy negotiations in the 1970s, Pakistan accepted that India constructed Salal on the terms 
that India agreed to block the low-level gated spillways on the dam permanently. In 2001, the 
storage at Salal was filled with up to 90 meters of silt and India considered using the gated 
spillways they had agreed to never use. Drawdown flushing could have helped the power 
plant to operate much more effectively, but it would also violate the IWT. Releasing large 
amount of water and silt could possibly flood and damage crops in downstream areas. This 
would have included areas both in India and in Pakistan. Using the low-level gated spillways 
would also have reduced the level of water in Salal to a level below the dead storage, enabling 
India to stop the flow of water in Chenab while re-filling the storage.
183
  
Indian media started reporting in 2002 that India considered abrogating the IWT. 
These speculations arose because of the problems at Salal, the terror attacks, and the 
dissatisfaction with the IWT in J&K. In April 2002, the J&K Legislative Assembly called for 
a review of the IWT. A representative from the assembly was complaining that "[w]e are 
exporting water to Pakistan and in return Pakistan is exporting cross-border terrorism”.184 In 
the first 5 months of 2002, several Indian newspapers continued to report that India 
considered scrapping the IWT.
185
 
The consequences of a possible abrogation were highly uncertain. There seemed to be 
benefits in unexploited hydropower potential in J&K, but how would this affect the relations 
with Pakistan? Could India discard the IWT without adverse consequences? Indian Minister 
of Water Resources, Bijoya Chakraborty, stated in May 2002 that the IWT could be scrapped 
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and that the consequences would be adverse for Pakistan: "If we decide to scrap the Indus 
Water Treaty, then there will be drought in Pakistan and the people of that country would 
have to beg for every drop of water."
186
 The importance and the tension in Indo-Pakistani 
hydropolitical relations in 2001/2002 attracted more attention towards the Indus Basin and 
there seemed to be much uncertainty about whether India and Pakistan would still be able to 
cooperate on water sharing in the Indus Basin. Information and knowledge provided by 
experts in the field of water were much in need. What did the Indian water experts 
recommend?  
 
Demand for a review of the IWT 
More Indian experts presented their perspectives in this period. One of these was Kashmiri 
professor Kulbushan Warikoo, who argued that the IWT was unfair to India and especially to 
J&K. Calculations by Warikoo based on population, drainage area, length of rivers and 
cultivable area, showed that India should have been given 42.8 % of the river water in the 
Indus Basin. Warikoo estimated that India only had gotten about 20%. He therefore strongly 
supported J&K Legislative Assembly's demand for a review of the IWT.
187
   
 Brahma Chellaney went further than Warikoo in his IWT-criticism.
188
 Chellaney had 
been National Security Council advisory board member until 2000, and served as a member 
of the Policy Advisory Group headed by the Foreign Minister of India. He believed that the 
competition over water resources in the Indus Basin would lead to conflict between India and 
Pakistan. As a reaction to the terror attacks against the Indian Parliament, Chellaney stated 
that “[t]he time for peaceful negotiations is over”.189  In an article in 2002, Chellaney wrote 
that he was surprised that the upcoming PIC-meeting would be hosted by India, considering 
Indo-Pak relations at that time. Several Indian and Pakistani newspapers reported beforehand 
that the PIC meeting scheduled for May 2002 would be cancelled by India.
190
 These concerns 
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Under the headline, “India should act, not just talk,” Chellaney advocated that India 
should abrogate the IWT. However, Chellaney advised that before India pulled out of the 
IWT, they should construct more storage capacity on the Indus River system, and thus have 
the option of using the water as a weapon.
192
 Could India have used an abrogation of the IWT 
as a means of punishing Pakistan, and could India use water as a weapon? Iyer discussed this, 
stating on the one hand that “no immediate punishment of Pakistan would have been 




India had at that time constructed nearly 20 dams on the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, all 
of them designed with only a small storage capacity, in accordance with the provisions of the 
IWT. However, the combined effect of 20 dams withholding or releasing water would cause 
damage on Pakistan.
194
 Editor of the magazine Dams, River & People, Himanshu Thakkar 
stated that: 
 
While India does not have storage on the three rivers – the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum 
- allocated to Pakistan under the treaty, it can inflict damage on Pakistani territory by 
opening the gates of the smaller structures constructed on them in the Indian territory 
and thus release water suddenly into Pakistani territory. It can do something similar in 





Iyer argued that this water weapon would only cause a temporary hardship for Pakistan, and 
both Iyer and Himanshu asserted that it would also adversely affect India, and it should 
therefore not be done. 
India could construct new dams with storages on the western rivers. India had several 
dams on the drawing board, and small or medium dams can be constructed in a few 
months.
196
 Iyer estimated that any storage on the western rivers will take 10-15 years to be 
built. That may be true, but small and medium dams can inflict harm on Pakistan, and large 
dams can be constructed in less than 10 years. Consider Baglihar with its capacity of 450MW 
which was constructed in about 8-10 years with considerable interruptions, or the Lower 
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Subansiri Dam (2000MW) in Arunachal Pradesh estimated to be completed in 7 years,
197
 or 
the Cetin Dam (517MW) in Turkey which has been under construction since 2011 and will be 
completed by 2015.
198
  Chellaney was eager to explore ways to punish Pakistan. He agreed 
with Iyer that India would need to build more storage before they could implement the 
retaining of water as a political weapon, but added that India could “play havoc with 




Verghese and Iyer warning against abrogation 
In 2002, Ramaswamy R. Iyer and BG Verghese described the IWT similarly to earlier texts 
by Iyer (1999), Swain (2001) and Biswas (1999) and Verghese (1997), i.e., it was an 
acceptable and partly successful treaty, and because it had functioned despite Indo-Pakistani 
wars. In 2002 Verghese strongly advised that India should keep the IWT, and he praised the 
treaty as “one of the major triumphs of the United Nations system.”200  
Verghese and Iyer both denied that the IWT was in trouble and the suggestions that 
there was no correspondence between the two countries on the Baglihar issue. Iyer suggested 
that the Baglihar dispute had been difficult to resolve because of the troubled relations 
between India and Pakistan in the recent years, and that it “may have been resolved […] in 
due course if the circumstances had been normal.”201 Iyer asserted that the idea of abrogation 
was an “irresponsible and indefensible argument”. 202 Verghese similarly rejected Chellaney’s 
advice to pull out of the treaty, arguing that: 
 
Abrogation would be indefensible on any understanding of international water law, 
international humanitarian law and the rules of war. Further, it would lend credence to 
Pakistan’s claim to J&K as a “lifeline” because the Indus, on which it is almost solely 
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 He also warned that an abrogation might legitimize sabotage of Indian dams. Verghese, "Talk of Abrogating 
the Indus Water Treaty." 
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Verghese gives two reasons for rejecting abrogation: that it contradicts international law and 
that it would help Pakistan’s claim to J&K. Iyer agreed with the first point and added that 
reactions from the World Bank and the international community would have been adverse. If 
India abrogated the IWT, Iyer asserted that Nepal and Bangladesh would lose faith in their 
cooperation with India over the Ganga and the Brahmaputra.  
The international convention which according to Iyer guided what India could do as an 
upper riparian, and according to Verghese would make abrogation indefensible was The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses.
204
 This convention has been regarded as the most authoritative set of principles 
on trans-boundary river waters.
205
 Yet, the convention was merely adopted by the U.N., not 
ratified, and there is no mechanism in place to enforce the principles.
206
 This does not imply 
that the convention has been worthless, and there seems to be a consensus that the convention 
can be important as a set of basic principles which future agreements can be based on.
207
 But 
the central point is that these principles did not make abrogation of the IWT either 
indefensible or illegal. The U.N. convention could not restrict India from constructing 
storages on the western rivers of the Indus River system. 
 
Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty 
Although defending the IWT against abrogation-advocacy, both Iyer and Verghese suggested 
that the treaty could be improved. They both touched upon this in their articles from in 1997 
and 1999, and elaborated a bit in 2002.  
Verghese was the only expert thus far who had commented on the dissatisfaction in 
J&K. In 1997, he suggested that his idea of an enhanced Indus treaty, an “Indus-II”, would 
optimize the water management with great benefits for J&K.
208
 The Chief Minister of J&K at 
that time, Farooq Abdullah, complained that the IWT constrained the state from utilizing the 
potential in the western rivers of the Indus Basin. Verghese disagreed with Abdullah, although 
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recognizing that “there could be an element of in-built restraint in the more distant future.”209 
Verghese argued that there was room for improvement in the understanding of the details in 
the IWT. According to the IWT, India can exploit the waters in the western rivers to a greater 
extent.
210
 Verghese wrote that the dissatisfaction in J&K was ungrounded, because India had 
not utilized the western rivers to the extent that the IWT allowed them to.
211
  
The IWT says that India can build storages meant for run-of-the-river hydro plants, 
non-consumptive uses or flood mitigation for a total of 3.60 million acre feet of water. 
Verghese stated that India had not built any storage so far but should look into how to best 
exploit the potential in accordance with the treaty provisions. The definition of storage, non-
consumptive uses, and run-of-the-river are carefully explained in the IWT. Even though 
storages will decrease the amount of water downstream because of evaporation and reduced 
speed of flow, India is allowed to construct run-of-river hydro plants with small storage 
capacity. 
Iyer responded to the critique from J&K, stating that J&K’s interests were kept in 
view while negotiating the IWT. Iyer was partly right because the treaty specifies that India 
can exploit the western rivers in J&K to some extent, and that that potential had not yet been 
fully exploited, as Verghese pointed out. However, Brahma Chellaney stated in 2012 that 
former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ignored the interest of J&K when he signed the 
treaty.
 212
 The governments of India and Pakistan acted as monoliths during the mediation 
process and the different regional states of the two countries were not represented during the 
negotiations.
213
 The final result, i.e. the IWT, did not totally ignore J&K. It gave the partly 
autonomous state rights to utilize water for irrigation, hydro-electric power generation and 
non-consumptive uses. Yet Chellaney was perhaps more right in a long-term perspective. 
Water scarcity in the Indus Basin has been severely increasing since 1960, and power 
shortages in J&K are considerable. Even if India and J&K had exploited the full potential the 
IWT allowed them, there would still be issues. These issues could be dealt with by 
implementing joint management of the river basin and other IWRM-principles.  
Iyer gave his reasons for arguing that the interests of J&K were kept in view when 
signing the IWT by describing that the negotiation were “long and hard” and that “the Indian 
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team did its best under whatever briefing it had from the government.”214 Expert on the 
mediation process, Undala Alam, does not suggest that the lengthy negotiations had much to 
do with the interest of J&K. Although Nehru was Kashmiri, he was blamed by Indians for 
ignoring the needs of J&K and giving away 80% of the water. The Former President of 
Pakistan, Ayub Khan is likewise criticized in Pakistan for giving away all of the water in the 
three eastern rivers which normally would have flown into Pakistani Punjab. The interests of 
J&K did not seem to be prioritized, but in 2002 they at least attracted more attention from 
Indian experts, which previously had ignored them in their published texts. Warikoo and 
Chellaney openly supported the demand for water in J&K, while Iyer and Verghese were 
more reserved. 
Verghese’s again suggested to improve water management by renegotiating a new 
Indus treaty – an “Indus –II”. He wrote that the Indus-II “would be a means of bringing both 
sides of J&K across the [Line of Control] as a single, bountiful natural resource region.”215 
This must be understood as a suggestion of implementing IWRM-principles in the Indus 
Basin water management. In 1997, he said that improved Indo-Pakistani relations would be 
necessary if India and Pakistan should be able to manage the Indus River system jointly, and 
considering the poor relations in 2002, his idea seemed unrealistic at that point.  
 
Abrogation denied 
Late May 2002, the 88
th
 PIC meeting took place in Delhi. During the meeting, Pakistan again 
expressed their concern over Baglihar and expressed their desire to visit the construction site, 
but India refused. The Pakistani officials stated that the Baglihar dispute should be resolved 
within three months. If not, Pakistan would consider referring the matter to a third party – a 
“Neutral Expert”.216 That would in case have been the first time a third party would be 
involved in an issue under the IWT.  
Perhaps viewed as a more urgent issue than Baglihar at the time, Indian abrogation of 
the IWT was denied. Indian Minister of Water Resources, Bijoya Chakraborty, announced 
that “there is no question of abrogating the treaty. The present tension will have no bearing on 
the talks.”217 Chakraborty explained that abrogation of the IWT would only be considered if 
Pakistan would resort to war. The Indian government had acted as Iyer and Verghese had 
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advised them to, and seemingly ignored the demand for a review of the IWT in J&K and 
those who called for a tougher line against Pakistan. While the PIC meeting took place in 
Delhi, two people were killed and 25 others injured in Garend village in Kashmir. Police had 
fired at a group of villagers fighting over sharing water from an irrigation stream.
218
 
 In November 2002, the new Chief Minister of J&K, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, said he 
accepted that India had not scrapped the IWT, but he still called the treaty discriminatory to 
J&K.
219
 Sayeed asked for compensation for the loss suffered by J&K on account of the IWT, 
and soon after the Indian government granted J&K additional resources of 1.37 billion 
Rupees. In addition, the construction of Baglihar went on. Was India finally acknowledging 
the hydropower interest of J&K, and how did Pakistan react to this? 
 
2003-2004: No progress on the Baglihar dispute 
Media and scholarly attention towards the IWT gradually increased in 2001 and 2002. In 
2000, The Hindu, Hindustan Times and The Times of India, had written six articles which 
mentioned the IWT. In 2001, the number of articles had increased to 19. In 2002, the number 
of articles was 46, while both in 2003 and 2004, the number of articles per year was 42.
220
 
Most of the articles from 2003 and 2004 dealt with the Baglihar dispute.  
 In January 2003, four Pakistani High Commission officials were expelled from India. 
They were accused of "indulging in activities incompatible with their official status", but 
Indian press suggested that it rather was a retaliation after the Indian chargé d’affaires in 
Islamabad had been harassed earlier that month.
221
 It was therefore a surprise when the Indian 
Indus Commissioner traveled to Islamabad in early February to meet his Pakistani 
counterpart. The two Indus commissioners were accompanied by several officials in the water 
sector and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agenda for the meeting was the dispute over 
Baglihar. The Pakistani Indus commissioner, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah, again asked if a Pakistani 
team could inspect the Baglihar construction site, but no agreement were reached. Shah 




In Pakistan, there were signs of frustration over India’s decision to go ahead with the 
construction of Baglihar despite Pakistan’s objections. The then Pakistani President of Azad 
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Kashmir, Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, asked whether “Pakistan [is] going to stay put and 
wait until India diverts the river? Pakistan would be devastated."
223
 Khan emphasized the 
importance of the Indus River system to Pakistan, and suggested that any manipulation of the 
waters on the Indian side could lead to an attack from Pakistan: "Many people say that in the 
future wars may be fought over water. You cannot ignore that because the whole economy of 
Pakistan is centered around the water that flows from Kashmir.”224 He expressed a common 
view in Pakistan, stating that “without the rivers of Kashmir, Pakistan will become a desert. 
The freedom fighters of Kashmir are in reality fighting for Pakistan's water security”.225 





Another inconclusive PIC-meeting 
In May 2003, the PIC met again, and Pakistan reiterated their complaint that Baglihar was 
violating the IWT.
227
 India finally agreed to let a team lead by the Pakistani Indus 
Commissioner Syed Jamaat Ali Shah inspect the Baglihar construction site. Shah wanted to 
inspect the site to see if there was any need for constructing gated spillways at a low level on 
the dam. The Indian commissioner argued that these gated spillways were warranted at the 
site. The issue was similar to the Pakistan’s issue with the Salal hydro plant in the 1970s. The 
gated spillways would enable India to flush silt from the storage, while Pakistan feared that 
the gates would enable India to release huge amount of water to flood the downstream areas.  
Despite disagreeing over the design of Baglihar, Shah expressed optimistically that the 
issue would be solved according to the provisions of the IWT.
228
 However, Shah had already 
before the inspection tour recommended to the Pakistani Government that they should refer 
the Baglihar dispute to a neutral expert. This was one of the conflict resolution mechanisms 
under the IWT that either of the countries could invoke if the PIC was not able to solve 
disagreements under the IWT. The involvement of a third-party had not happened since the 
mediation process of the treaty. 
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 "Indus Water Meet - Pak sticks to stand on Baglihar," The Times of India, 1 June 2003. 
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Even though the Baglihar dispute was linked with conflict and war by Pakistani 
officials, and a third party mediation seemed likely, none of the Indian experts published texts 
commenting on the Baglihar dispute in 2003 and 2004. Was the issue of gated spillways 
viewed as a minor issue that would probably be solved, or at least not lead to conflict? India 
and Pakistan had discussed the Tulbul Navigation Project for 20 years without agitation. But 
the Tulbul project would not generate electricity for J&K, and the officials of J&K had first of 
all demanded hydropower, pressuring India to complete the Baglihar. 
Silt control was important at the Salal hydro plant, and seemed to be important again 
at Baglihar. However, Chief Minister of J&K, Mufti Muhammad Sayeed, stated that the 
objections raised by Pakistan were not justified, since Baglihar would not store any river 
water he argued, and thereby ignoring the fact that Baglihar would have a small reservoir. 
Sayeed believed that the Baglihar issue would be solved, but based these assumptions on 
slightly improved Indo-Pakistani relations from mid-2003. Sayeed asked the Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to re-open negotiations on the Tulbul Navigation Project. 
Sayeed stated that “the project will also help Pakistan in the lean season.”229 From 2005, other 
Indian experts similarly claimed that the Indian projects on the western rivers could help 
Pakistan, providing flood control and storage for the lean season.
230
 
Sayeed’s wishes were fulfilled. During the first round of the Composite Dialogue talks 
between India and Pakistan in 2004, the Secretaries of the respective countries Water Ministry 
Departments reaffirmed commitment to the IWT and agreed to discuss the Tulbul Navigation 
Project at the next round of talks. Baglihar were also discussed and progress on the issue was 
reported, without specifying what kind of progress.
231
  
While Indo-Pakistani relations in general seemed to be improving and Indian press 
reported that the two countries showed commitment to the IWT, there were not any real 
improvement on water issues. In late 2004, the Pakistani official grew tired of the prolonged 
and unsuccessful talks on Baglihar, and warned India that if the issue was not solved before 
January 7, 2005, they would invoke third party mediation, i.e. referring the Baglihar dispute to 
a “neutral expert”.232  
No Indian experts published any texts commenting on the developments in 2003 and 
2004, but two publications discussed Indus Basin hydropolitics to a certain degree.  
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Indian researcher, Roshni Chakraborty published an article on Indian hydropolitics in 2004.
233
 
Whether Chakraborty was a water expert is questionable, but her article is interesting because 
it was published in the well-renowned journal Water International.
234
 The article provides an 
example of the growing attention toward the Indus Basin hydropolitics. She mainly 
summarized and paraphrased the attitude of other water experts on the topic. There are some 
confusing remarks in the article such as: 
 
India has recently been labeled as water scarce. It has not been able to derive 
sustainable water management results, and the chances of water conflicts are obvious. 
 
Followed shortly after by,  
 
If this continues, India may attain the ambiguous designation of being a water scarce 




   
There were also a few examples of plagiarism in the article. A paragraph of her article was 
copied from an article written by Iyer.
236
 Iyer himself used sections of this article as a chapter 
in his book Water: Perspectives, Issues, Concerns published in 2003, but with a few changes 
and comments.
237
 Chakraborty copied a paragraph from Iyer’s article from 1999 and referred 
to Iyer’s book from 2003. In the book however, Iyer had removed the paragraph.238 
 
Managing water conflict  
Indian experts did not publish any articles on Indus Basin hydropolitics in 2004. Talk of 
abrogating the IWT had cooled off, but India and Pakistan were still discussing the Baglihar 
without any seemingly progress. The only Indian expert that published a text commenting on 
Indus Basin hydropolitics was Ashok Swain. In his book Managing Water Conflict he 
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analyzed water scarcity in transboundary river basins in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. He 
concluded that there was a water crisis in several of the river basins, and that unless a 
comprehensive approach to river basin management would be implemented, there would be 
conflict over water in the near future.
239
  
Swain position himself within the school of thought that believes water scarcity in 
transboundary river basin might lead to conflict over water.
240
 Swain argued that the 
connection between water scarcity and water conflict was evident in empirical studies from a 
number of river basins around the globe. One of the examples was the Sikh secessionist 
movement in Punjab which reached its voltage peak in the 1980s. Swain asserted that demand 
for more water in Punjab was one of the reasons for conflict. In the 1950s and 1960s, India 
began diverting water from the three eastern rivers in the Indus Basin: Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, 
from Punjab and into the neighboring states Haryana and Rajasthan.
241
 This was still a tense 
issue when Swain published Managing water conflict, both between Punjab, Haryana and 
Rajasthan but also within the states. In 2004, four people were killed and over 30 people were 
injured during protests over allocations of water between towns in Rajasthan. The protestors 
demanded more water from the Indira Gandhi Irrigation Canal which diverts water from 
Sutlej and into Rajasthan.
242
 Before 1960, the Sutlej flowed into Pakistan, but the IWT 
allowed India to divert most of the water that historically had fed Pakistani Punjab.  
From 2004, the Indian Punjab state government denied Rajasthan any rights to the 
waters of Ravi or Beas. Punjab contended that the availability of water was less than earlier 
estimated, and they fear that there will not be enough to provide the farmlands of Punjab with 
enough water for irrigation if Rajasthan gets their estimated share. Everyone wants more 
water, or at least, they want what they view as “their share of the water”. But it does not seem 
to be enough to cover the demands of both Punjab and Rajasthan. Although this thesis does 
not examine the disputes between states within India and Pakistan, they are part of the 
potential crisis in the Indus Basin. 
Ramaswamy R. Iyer has argued that if India and Pakistan had signed a more 
cooperative treaty than the IWT, based on IWRM-principles, with sharing and joint 
management on each of the six Indus Rivers, the situation would have been completely 
different. Pakistan’s rights as a lower riparian would have been prioritized over Indian Punjab 
and Rajasthan, and the Indira Gandhi Canal would not have been constructed. Punjab and 
                                                 
239
 Ashok Swain, Managing water conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East  (London: Routledge, 2004). 
240
 Ibid., pages: 12, 19, 21, 24-25, 27, 28, 30. 
241
 Ibid., p. 21-23.  
242
 "Police kill water protestors in India," Hindustan Times, 4 December 2004. 
58 
 
would have had less availability of water, and Rajasthan would have had no rights to the 
Indus waters.
243
 Swain examined other examples of intra-state conflict as well, but found few 
examples of violent conflict over water between states. Swain argued that water has played an 
indirect role in wars, and that a war over territory which contains water resources can be 
viewed as a water war, because wars are rarely fought over just one issue. He therefore 
concluded that “by just looking at the simple data sets, we should not dismiss the war causing 
potential of water scarcity”.244 
 Swain listed “riparian dispute over Indus” as an example of an international water 
conflict, and referred to the conflict in 1948 when India diverted water away from Pakistan 
during the India-Pakistan War.
245
 In addition, Swain suggested that riparian dispute over 
Indus, water war and the Kargil Conflict could be connected. He wondered whether an in-
depth study of the Kargil Conflict might reveal that control over water resources was a motive 
for the armed conflict on the Siachen Glacier. This assumption was later supported one year 
later by another Indian expert, Sundeep Waslekar. His text, which will be examined in the 
next chapter, argues that the then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf’s Kashmir policy was 
to secure “Pakistan’s lifeline”, i.e. the Indus River system.246 Swain did not speculate which 
role Musharraf had played in the Kargil Conflict or on water issues, but Swain viewed the 
2000s as a period of tension and uncertainty in Indus Basin hydropolitics.  
Swain believed India and Pakistan had been on the verge of water conflict in 2002. He 
referred to that India considered abrogating the IWT, and he claimed that contact between the 
two Indus Commissioners had been at a minimum since late 2001. While the speculations 
about IWT-abrogation were supported by Indian officials, the argument about lack of PIC-
meetings is unfounded. Swain viewed a period of six months without any meetings, 
December 2001 to May 2002, as an example of how bad relations were, when in fact, the two 
Indus Commissioners were only supposed to meet at least once a year.
247
 There were 
speculations in media that the PIC would not meet in 2002, but they met as scheduled in May 
2002.
248
 Thus, the PIC met in 2001 and 2002, in accordance with the IWT. Did Swain 
simplify the causal connection between water scarcity and water conflict? 
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Exaggerating the risk of water war? 
The connection between water scarcity and water conflict is much debated.
249
 While there are 
several historical examples of violent conflict over water,
250
 and this thesis argues that India 
and Pakistan were on the brink of conflict during the Baglihar dispute, there are also reasons 
to question whether the risk of water conflict might be exaggerated. According to Julian L. 
Simon, there are four reasons to why false bad news dominates public discussion about 
resource scarcity: 1. It is easier to get funding for research that presents bad news. 2. It sells 
more books, newspapers and magazines. 3. Humans have a psychological predisposition to 
compare the present to an ideal, and therefore the present looks worse/bad. 4. Idealistic belief 
that dire predictions can mobilize to make things better.
251  
 
The Indian experts that warned explicitly about water conflict in the Indus Basin were 
Chakraborty, Chellaney and Swain. They are all considerable younger than Iyer, Verghese 
who rejected violent interstate water conflict. During the period 1999-2004, Swain, 
Chakraborty and Chellaney all published their first texts on hydropolitics. Simon’s two first 
reasons for exaggerating the risk of conflict might be relevant for scholars trying to establish 
themselves. 
David Katz points out an incentive that causes academics to exaggerate risk of violent 
conflict: to raise the profile of author or organization.
252
 Swain and Iyer both recognized 
issues of water scarcity in the Indus Basin, but Iyer was not alarmed by the possibility of 
conflict over the water. Iyer had already established himself as one of India’s foremost water 
experts, while Swain got his professorate after the publication of Managing Water Conflict. 
Katz elaborates on this incentive: 
  
In the case of academics, connecting water to security also offers researchers a way to 
raise the profile of their work, given the salience of security issues in high-level policy 
circles and with the general public. Doing so increases the potential to gain access to 
policy-makers and the media. There is some evidence that water research stressing 
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Katz’ emphasized that his incentive are suggestive rather than conclusive, and his theory lacks 
a “method for identifying when such incentives are in fact responsible for actions by a given 
party”.254  
According to my newspaper survey it seems likely that the speculation about 
abrogation and conflict led to increased attention toward the Indus Basin during the early 
years of the Baglihar dispute. However, there seemed to be little reason to exaggerate the risk, 




This chapter has outlined the Indus Basin hydropolitics from the late 1990s up to and 
including 2004. Before 2001, there was little tension in the Indo-Pakistani water sharing 
relations. Contemporary Indus Basin hydropolitics did not attract much attention among 
Indian experts. The experts agreed that the IWT was not a treaty that arranged for optimal 
water management in the Indus Basin, but that it was an acceptable treaty because it had 
enabled India and Pakistan to avoid conflicts over water. 
 However, officials in J&K criticized the IWT sharply, because it hindered J&K from 
developing their hydropower potential. The critique from J&K was almost totally ignored 
among Indian experts. On the other hand, the Indian government seemed to heed the calls 
from J&K when they started constructing Baglihar in 1999. 
 From that point onwards, India had to deal with criticism from both J&K and Pakistan. 
J&K called for more hydropower projects on the western rivers and demanded a review of the 
IWT, while Pakistan objected to any Indian interference on these rivers. The Indian experts 
had to provide information on how India could maintain relations with both J&K and 
Pakistan, while at the same time enhancing their water management. 
 While Brahma Chellaney advocated that India should abrogate the IWT, most Indian 
experts rejected this as a dangerous idea. Verghese and Swain proposed that a new treaty 
should be renegotiated, based on IWRM-principles, but Iyer refused this as unrealistic. India 
dealt with the situation in accordance with how Iyer had suggested: to keep the IWT and rely 
on the PIC to resolve any disputes. According to Iyer, J&K had little reason to criticize the 
IWT. 
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 However, the PIC did not seem to reach an agreement on the Baglihar dispute, and 
Pakistani official suggested that the World Bank should intervene in the dispute. In the next 










4. The Baglihar dispute: 2005-2008 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The struggle for water in the [Indus River system] will determine whether the nuclear 
powers, India and Pakistan, will wage war or have peace, and to a large degree 
determine the question of Kashmir.255 
  
Pakistan’s annual freshwater availability per capita had declined from 5,600 cubic meters in 
1947 to 1,200 cubic meters in 2005. Groundwater was increasingly exploited and the annual 
flow of water in the Indus River system was dropping. Expectations for the hydrological 




January 2005, the Government of Pakistan requested the World Bank to appoint a 
“Neutral Expert” to solve the long pending dispute with India over the Baglihar.257 Involving 
a neutral expert is one of four institutionalized methods of solving hydropolitical 
disagreements on the sharing of the Indus River system between India and Pakistan. When the 
World Bank appointed Swiss engineer Raymond Lafitte as the neutral expert in May 2005, it 
marked the ending of an era of Indus Basin hydropolitics. This was the first time India and 
Pakistan were unable to solve a bilateral water dispute since the IWT came into force in 1960.  
The same day Pakistan requested a neutral expert, India killed five Pakistani terrorists 
crossing the Line of Control into the Poonch sector of the Jammu Region in India. A few 
hours later, Pakistani mortars were fired into Poonch. The Indian Defense Minister, Pranab 
Mukherjee, responded saying that India was considering re-deploying troops along the Line of 
Control, troops that had been withdrawn a few months earlier as a confidence building 
measure in Indo-Pakistani relation.
258
 Confusion and uncertainty characterized the situation. 
A little over a year after India and Pakistan had signed a cease-fire, and relations seemed to be 
improving, bilateral talks on Baglihar broke down and the cease-fire was violated by both 
countries. The Baglihar dispute seemed to suggest that water issues were more important than 
ever to both countries. 
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This chapter explores the Indus Basin hydropolitics from 2005 till late 2008. The 
chapter is divided in five sections. The first section focuses on Pakistan’s request for a neutral 
expert, and the reactions among Indian experts. The second section deals with the increasing 
attention towards the Pakistani view regarding the Baglihar dispute. Indian experts questioned 
the Pakistani motives for objecting to Baglihar, and discussed whether they were legitimate. A 
few experts also suggested how India should respond. 
The third part examines the perspectives and interests of commentators in J&K. Indian 
experts connected the interest of J&K with the idea of renegotiating the IWT. The fourth 
section deals with the neutral expert’s verdict in the Baglihar dispute and reactions to the 
verdict. The last section briefly examines the hydropolitics development after the Baglihar 
dispute officially ended. It becomes clear that there were still issues concerning Baglihar that 
might provoke India or Pakistan into further aggression. In addition, India started constructing 
other hydro plants on the western rivers. 
 
Third party interference at the request of Pakistan 
When a hydropolitical issue arises between India and Pakistan, the IWT describes in detail 
how the issue shall be dealt with. The PIC is the prioritised authority to resolve the issue.
259
 
Several PIC-meetings are often required to arrive at conclusions. If the PIC is unable to solve 
the question, the issue is sent to the member states’ Foreign Secretaries for negotiation.260 If 
the Foreign Secretaries are unable to resolve the issue there are two other possibilities to solve 




When neither the PIC nor the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan were able to 
solve the Baglihar dispute, Pakistan requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert. 
The process of appointing a neutral expert was complicated. Indian officials initially refused, 
demanding that the Baglihar dispute should be solved bilaterally. The World Bank therefore 
asked Pakistan to substantiate that the dispute had indeed reached a stage where a neutral 
expert was needed. Pakistan sent a lengthy report to that effect, and India replied with an 
equally voluminous report. This exchange of documentation through the World Bank went on 
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for three rounds. After a thorough analysis of the reports, the Bank concluded that it was 
necessary to appoint a neutral expert. On April 25, 2005, the Bank informed the parties of this 




Reactions to Pakistan’s request  
Immediately after Pakistan requested the World Bank to interfere, there were reactions from 
India. The number of newspaper articles covering Indus Basin hydropolitics reached an all-
time high in 2005. The earlier “record” was in 2002, when The Hindu, Hindustan Times and 
The Times of India, had written 46 articles which mentioned the IWT.
263
 In 2005, there were 
441 articles. Hindustan Times covered the Baglihar dispute on a nearly daily basis, presenting 
a range of Indian perspectives on the latest development. It was apparent that the interference 
of a neutral expert had created anticipation and uncertainty. The IWT and the PIC had been 
famous for solving hydropolitical issues, which the Pakistani request seemed to put an end to. 
Many of the articles speculated on possible outcomes of the dispute.
264
 While Indo-Pakistani 




Most Indian reactions to Pakistan’s approach to the World Bank were negative, and 
also Pakistani officials were skeptical. Pakistan Minister of Education, Qazi Javed Ashraf, put 
little faith in the neutral expert’s attempt to resolve the issue. Ashraf said that Pakistan should 
consider war against India if the Baglihar dispute was not settled and India did not stop 
constructing hydroelectric projects which allegedly violated the IWT.
266
 Pakistani opposition 
leader, Raza Rabbani, criticized the Pakistani government for having remained silent when 
India constructed hydro plants such as Salal and Dulhasti on the western Indus Rivers, and for 
not being able to stop India from constructing Baglihar.
267
   
While Pakistani reactions could be summed up as “too little, too late”, the critique 
from India was opposite. Indian Foreign Secretary, Syam Saran, called the Pakistani request 
to the World Bank “premature”. He criticized the Pakistani officials for ending the bilateral 
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talks on the issue. Pakistani officials replied that they would only return to the negotiation 
table if India immediately stopped constructing the hydro plant, which India refused.
268
  
India had continued constructing Baglihar after negotiations broke down, claiming that 
suspending construction would be too costly. The construction costs of two other hydro plants 
on Chenab River, Salal and Dulhasti, had been enormous. Construction of the Dulhasti 
hydroelectric project began in 1983 was completed in 2007. The project came to a halt in the 
mid-1980s due to terrorist activity, and the costs of the project - which was estimated to be 
$50 million in 1983 – ended up costing well over $1 billion. Indian officials feared that if 
construction of Baglihar came to a halt, production costs would increase similarly.
269
 Work on 
the Baglihar had already been problematic due to the mountainous terrain, and in July and 
August 2005, two of its diversion tunnels collapsed due to a landslides. The second landslide 
blocked the flow of Chenab River, causing the dam to overflow. 
 
Indian experts 
In 2005, Indian experts finally published texts providing knowledge and information about the 
Baglihar dispute, after years of almost completely ignoring the issue. Ramaswamy R. Iyer 
alone wrote five published articles in the first half of 2005.  
Indian experts in general were disappointed and surprised by Pakistan’s decision, 
especially considering the improved Indo-Pakistani relations the latest year. Researcher at the 
important Indian Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, Uttam Kumar Sinha, called 
Pakistan’s hydropolitical act, “typical lower-riparian bogey.”270  This was a common view 
among the Indian experts, who argued that the Baglihar did not pose a threat to Pakistan. An 
editorial in the Indian journal Economic and Political Weakly from February 2005 claimed 
that the differences over Baglihar were not difficult on a technical level. It claimed that 
political reasons underlay Pakistan's objections, a view also supported by BG Verghese.
271
 
According to the editorial, the Baglihar dispute could have been solved in the same manner as 
the Salal dispute in the 1970s, i.e. at inter-governmental level.
272
  
Before Verghese’s and the other Indian reactions are examined further, it is necessary 
to explain the design of Baglihar further and examine Pakistan’s objections to the design.273 
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The similarities between Salal and Baglihar have been described in earlier chapters, but there 
were also differences, and also lessons learned from the Salal project which the editorial 
seemed to ignore. 
 
The design of Baglihar and Pakistan’s objections274 
Baglihar was to be a 144.5 meters high and 317 long concrete gravity dam.
275
 Its location was 
about 120 km from the Pakistani border and about 65 km upstream of the Salal dam.
276
 It 
would have an installed capacity of 450 MW, and another 450 MW after a second stage of the 
project was completed.
277
 Pakistan’s Indus Commissioner, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah, reported in 
July 2005 after a field visit to the construction site that large portions of the project had 
already been completed.  
Pakistan complained that a number of different design features of Baglihar did not 
conform to criteria in the IWT. The objections can broadly be put in three categories. First, 
Pakistan argued that gated spillways on a low level on the dam were unnecessary. But if the 
neutral expert allowed India to keep the gated spillways, Pakistan argued that they should be 
located at a higher level. Secondly, Pakistan argued that the level for the power intake tunnels 
was placed too low, referring to paragraph 8f of Annexure D in the IWT which says that: 
 
The intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest level consistent with 
satisfactory and economical construction of the Plant as a Run-of-River Plant and with 





Thirdly, Pakistan objected to the size of the dam’s pondage. Pondage is a term used to 
describe the live storage capacity of a run-of-the-river hydro plant. John Briscoe explains that: 
  
water stored behind a dam is divided between ‘live storage’, which the operator of the 
dam can manage through both gated spillways and power intakes, and lower-level 
‘dead storage’, which the operator cannot manage as he does not have outlets in the 
dam low enough to release this water.
279
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The annexure D of the IWT says that the maximum pondage shall not exceed twice the 
pondage required for so-called “firm power”.280 Pakistan argued that the pondage at Baglihar 
far exceeded what was required for firm power.  
The Pakistani objections against Baglihar can be described in less technical wording: 
They feared India’s growing control of the western rivers: Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, and 
intended to hinder India from constructing more projects. India on the other hand wanted to 
fully exploit the hydropower potential in these rivers. In order to achieve this, they sought to 
increase their sediment control of the silt-laden rivers.
281
 With more pondage, India could 
hold back more water. Placing the gated spillways at a lower level increased the pondage. The 
gated spillways enabled India greater control of the discharge of water from the pondage.  
Several Pakistani newspapers reported that India wanted to use Baglihar and other 
dams as a strategic weapon against Pakistan: filling the storage capacities of the dams in the 
lean season and discharging the maximum amount during floods.
282
 This was supported by 
Bashir A. Malik, an authority on the IWT in Pakistan, who had been part of the Pakistani 
negotiation team during the IWT talks in the 1950s.
283
  
 These Pakistani statements opposed the view of the editorial in Economic and 
Political Weakly, which argued that since the two governments had solved the Salal dispute in 
the 1970s, they should also be able to solve the Baglihar dispute. Both Baglihar and Salal are 
run-of-the-river projects which India was allowed to construct on the western rivers if the 
design was in line with the provisions of the IWT. The two dams were constructed with many 
of the same design features. Both are located on the Chenab River, the height of Salal is 117m 
while Baglihar was projected to be 144.5m. The installed capacity of Baglihar is 450 MW, 
and Salal has a total capacity of 690 MW.  However, when the editorial in Economic and 
Political Weakly argued that Baglihar should be solved in the same manner as Salal, it ignored 
the huge costs and problems at Salal. 
The Salal was initially constructed with gated spillways at a low level, but India 
agreed with Pakistan to block and never use them. The pondage of Salal is therefore much 
smaller than the pondage of Baglihar. The Salal therefore enabled India less control of the 
flow of the river than the Baglihar would. The Salal dispute was resolved by the Foreign 
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Secretaries in 1978, after the PIC failed to reach an agreement. The construction time and 
costs were high before the dam was commissioned in 1987. Since then, it has experienced 
serious problems decreasing its efficiency and life expectancy. Maintenance of the dam has 
been much more difficult and costly than anticipated, because the level of silt in the dam has 
at times reached about 90 m in the 113 m high dam.
284
 This was partly caused by the 
modifications to the design which were accepted by the Foreign Secretaries of India and 
Pakistan who solved the dispute.
285
 Less priority given to the issues of sedimentation was 
much more common before the 1980s, and the treaty itself from 1960 was according to 
Raymond Lafitte, “not particularly well developed with respect to its provisions on sediment 
transport.”286  
Against the backdrop of the problems experienced at Salal, India argued that a 
different design was necessary at Baglihar. As explained above, the gated spillways at 
Baglihar would increase India’s control of the sediment load and thereby increase the 
efficiency and the life expectancy of the dam. But the Pakistani officials pointed out that the 
gated spillways could be used to Pakistan’s disadvantage if India decided to release huge 
amount of water, especially during floods. And perhaps more frightening for Pakistan: If India 
emptied the water in the reservoir before the lean season (January – February), Pakistan 
contended that India could stop the flow of the river for 26-28 days by re-filling the dam.
287
  
Baglihar alone was probably not big enough to actually create a devastating flood or 
drought in Pakistan, but Pakistani officials were worried that if they accepted the design of 
Baglihar, it would have a precedent-setting importance.
288
  
The editorial in Economic and Political Weekly did not consider the Pakistani fears - 
that Baglihar could be used as a weapon of war - as legitimate. The Pakistani perspective on 
Indus Basin hydropolitics had largely been ignored by Indian experts up to that point. In order 
to avoid water conflict in the Indus Basin, the Indian experts began to discuss the Kashmiri 
perspectives on water issues in 2002. The developments in the Baglihar dispute in 2005 
similarly turned to wider interest in the Pakistani views. It seemed clear that India had to 
balance their water sharing relations with Pakistan and their internal politics in J&K in order 
to avoid water conflict in the Indus Basin. 
                                                 
284
 Praveen Swami, "A treaty questioned," Frontline, 27 April 2002. 
285
 S. Alam, "Sedimentation Management in Hydro Reservoirs," in Water India (Conference) (Delhi,2004). 
286
 Raymond Lafitte, "Baglihar Hydroelectric plant: Expert determination on points of difference referred by the 
Government of Pakistan under the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty," (Lausanne, Switzerland2007). 
287
 Sinha, "Two Neighbours and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters." 
288
 Robert G. Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro, "Spotlight on Indus River Diplomacy: India, Pakistan, and the 
Baglihar Dam Dispute," (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2006).; and Malik, Indus Waters 




Water through Pakistani eyes289 
In order to understand the Baglihar dispute, it is necessary to understand the importance of 
each drop of freshwater to Pakistan. In June 2005, the editor of the Pakistani newspaper The 
Friday Times said that the Indus River system was more important to Pakistan than the 
resolution of Kashmir. The editorial asked India to recognize how important and sensitive the 
Baglihar issue was to Pakistan.
290
 In news reports from Pakistan, opposition leaders were 
regularly quoted stating that the water disputes with India might derail the peace process with 
India, and lead to conflict.
291
 The Indian experts seemed to respond. From 2005, the Pakistan 
perspective attracted increasing attention in both Indian media and among Indian experts.  
 
The Pakistani perspective 
Pakistani researcher, Haris Gazdar, published an article in Economic and Political Weekly in 
February 2005, presenting a Pakistani perspective on the Baglihar dispute. Gazdar introduced 
perspectives that had been in ignored up to that point in India. Gazdar proclaimed that 
Baglihar was a core issue of national interest for Pakistan. He criticized Indian commentators 
for being negatively surprised by Pakistan request for a neutral expert. Requesting a neutral 
expert was the only reasonable option for Pakistan, according to Gazdar. He argued that 
Baglihar threatened Pakistan’s water supply which was “clearly critical to the economic 
prosperity and political stability of Pakistan.”292  
Gazdar pointed out that the IWT was an unequal treaty, because it failed to protect 
Pakistan’s entitlement to the Indus River system from the actions of India. According to 
Gazdar, Pakistan had historic rights to some of the waters in the eastern rivers, and the 
allocation of these rivers conflicted with internationally accepted principles of riparian 
division.  
Ramaswamy R. Iyer rejected most of Gazdar’s arguments. Iyer was disappointed with 
the article because it “failed to rise above a nationalistic and partisan approach.”293 Iyer 
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especially questioned the argument that Pakistan had “historic rights” to the eastern rivers. 
Iyer pointed out, that neither India nor Pakistan had signed the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, and it was not ratified in the UN. 
IWT were therefore the only rules India and Pakistan had to follow.
294
 Thus, Iyer contradicted 
what he had written in an article in 2002, when he argued that India could not abrogate the 
IWT because of the UN Convention which Iyer deemed irrelevant in 2005.
295
  
Iyer also questioned Gazdar’s definition of “riparian rights of Pakistan,” on the basis 
that Pakistan had accepted that the three eastern rivers were allocated to India when they 
signed the IWT. Iyer pointed out that Gazdar’s critique of IWT’s allocations of the eastern 
rivers, was similar to the grievances in J&K because of the allocation of the western rivers to 
Pakistan. Iyer replied to Gazdar, similar to how he replied to the critique from J&K in 2002, 
by advocating that Pakistan (and J&K) had to accept the IWT, even though the IWT was far 




Baglihar as a weapon of war 
BG Verghese denied that Baglihar would interfere with the supply of water in Pakistan.
297
 
Similar to the editorial in Economic and Political Weekly, he asserted that Pakistan’s 
objections to Baglihar were “political”. Verghese claimed that Pakistan’s Indus policy was to 
deny or delay “any Indian project” that would benefit J&K. The purpose, according to 
Verghese, was weakening India’s popularity and grip in J&K.  
In support of his argument, Verghese wrote that the Pakistani objections had little to 
do with their water supply, because the objections “were really pressed only recently”.298 
However, as shown in this thesis, Pakistan objected to Baglihar immediately after they 
learned about the project in the early 1990s, and the PIC held a special meeting on the 
Baglihar Project in New Delhi in 2000.
299
 In 2001, India announced that construction had 
begun and Pakistan immediately raised questions about the project. India denied Pakistan’s 
demand for an inspection tour to the Baglihar site in 2002, and Pakistan stated for the first 
                                                 
294
 Dealt with in the previous chapter. 
295
 Iyer, "Was the Indus Waters Treaty in Trouble?." 
296
 "Indus Treaty: 'Core' and Other Issues". 
297
 B. G. Verghese, "A Vision for J&K - 2015 - Part 2,"  IPCS Indo-Pak articles(2005), 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/a-vision-for-jk-2015-part-2-1706.html. 
298
 "Political Fuss Over The Indus." 
299
 Ministry of Water Resources (Government of India), "Annual Report 2000 - 2001," (New Delhi2001). 




time that they considered requesting the World Bank to interfere.
300
 Since 2002, Pakistan 
repeatedly wanted India to suspend construction, but India refused.
301
  
Verghese attempted to create a narrative which described Pakistan’s objections to 
Indian hydro plants as mainly political motivated, in order to hinder India’s influence in 
J&K.
302
 Verghese’s assumption that Pakistan only objected “recently” was imprecise, but it 
suited this narrative. Verghese had advocated since the late 1990s that India should exploit the 
waters of the western rivers further, with or without Pakistan’s consent, and he seemingly 
aimed to delegitimize the Pakistani objections. 
Even though he downplayed the point, Verghese recognized that Pakistan’s objections 
also were related to fear of increased Indian control of the western rivers. He labeled these 
fears as “fanciful”.303 Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, Shyam Saran, reacted similarly, 
stating that Pakistan’s claims were not based on facts.304  
Verghese argued that Pakistan had no reason to fear a sudden release of water to in the 
Chenab River valley in Pakistan, because this would affect upstream Indian towns before it 
would harm Pakistan. Verghese is partly correct, i.e. there are a few Indian towns along the 
Chenab River before it enters Pakistan. The largest is Akhnoor in the Jammu district, with a 
population of about 11.500. It is located where the Chenab River enters the plains, so a flood 
would definitely have an adverse effect on this area. However, Verghese did not mention that 
if India wanted to use water as a strategic weapon - releasing large amounts of water - the 
people in Akhnoor would of course be warned beforehand, while the people of Pakistan 
would probably be unaware until the flood reached their border.    
 Verghese also denied that Baglihar’s storage capacity could dry up the river in 
Pakistan, but he refrained from elaborating on this point. Based on average flow of river and 
the size of the pondage at Baglihar, Pakistan had estimated that India could block the flow of 
the river for almost a month during the lean season in January and February.
305
 John Briscoe, 
a former Senior Water Advisor for the World Bank, supported the Pakistani estimates, and he 
therefore believed Pakistan had every right to fear India’s cumulative live storage on the 
western rivers.
306
 Iyer replied to Briscoe in 2005, denying that the impact of Indian hydro 
projects was a legitimate concern. In 2011 however, Iyer revisited his earlier argument, and 
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said “opinion is divided on the question” and believed this was “a concern that needs to be 
taken seriously and should be jointly studied.”307 
Blocking the water would not generate power for India, and would of course also have 
some effects on the Indian parts of the river downstream, but the Chenab River water was not 
used for irrigation in India, as it was in Pakistan. The agriculture of Pakistan depended on a 
relatively steady flow of water from the western rivers. Blocking the water in Chenab River 
for a month would have a considerable effect on the downstream agricultural areas. Pakistan 
would not have forgotten that India had earlier blocked river water in the Indus River system: 
During the Kashmir War in 1948, India diverted the Sutlej River water at Ferozepur 
Headwork. Verghese on the other hand, seemed to have forgotten the 1948 War, stating that: 
“the argument that every dam can be used as a strategic weapon is perverse reasoning.”308 
With several dams similar to Baglihar, Pakistan would have reason to fear India’s control over 
the Chenab River, especially during a war. Indian expert and former advisor to the Indian 
Foreign Minister, Brahma Chellaney, had earlier advocated that blocking water was exactly 
what India should aim to do when they had constructed more hydro plants. In 2005, India had 
soon completed three on Chenab River: Baglihar, Salal and Dulhasti. While Verghese 
suggested that Pakistan objected to Baglihar in order to hinder India from developing J&K, a 
joint Indo-Pakistani study of Pakistani attitudes towards Baglihar argued that Pakistan was 
genuinely worried about their water supply.
309
 
Iyer and Verghese rejected the criticism of Pakistan, and maintained that the IWT was 
an acceptable treaty for both parties, but Indian experts seemed to think that the Pakistani 
perspective had to be examined further. Former chairman of the project on inter-linking of 
rivers in India, Suresh Prabhu, stated in April 2005: 
 
We often ignore the fact that water is the key to the ongoing Kashmir problem. It's an 
open secret that Pakistan doesn't like India to control the source of Indus river basin 
from which it gets regular flow of water. At present, Pakistan is facing huge water 




Chellaney later linked the increased tension over Indo-Pakistani water issues in this period 
with inter-country politics in Pakistan.
311
 The province of Punjab in Pakistan had increasingly 
utilized the waters in the Indus River system, with severe effect in the downstream province 
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of Sindh. The reduction of water flow led to catastrophic consequences in the Indus delta. 
Salty sea-water has flown in to the river with a devastating effect on the ecology of the delta. 
Fishermen from the region have actually welcomed the recent huge floods as “good news”, 
because they have brought fish back to the delta."
312
 The inter-country water allocation in 
Pakistan has caused increasing tension between Sindh and Punjab. According to Chellaney, 
“the Punjabi elites that rule Pakistan have sought to scapegoat India for their appropriation 
and gross mismanagement of water resources.”313 
 
Kashmir’s water was the core issue. 
The new turn in Pakistan’s Indus Basin policy interested the Indian experts. As noted earlier, 
the Baglihar dispute did not attract much attention from the Indian experts before 2005. One 
hand, the Baglihar dispute was a part of a historical trend in Indus Basin hydropolitics.
314
 On 
the other hand, the Baglihar dispute introduced new aspects in Indus Basin hydropolitics: 
First, India did not suspend construction even though Pakistan demanded it, and secondly, 
Pakistani officials and opposition leaders suggested the Baglihar dispute could lead to war. In 
addition to this, the Baglihar dispute happened during a period when freshwater availability 
per capita in the region was at an all-time low and shrinking.  
Most Indian experts criticized Pakistani for requesting the World Bank and a neutral 
expert to interfere in the Baglihar dispute, but the experts also sought to understand the 
motives for Pakistan’s policy decision. 
President of the Mumbai-based think tank Strategic Foresight Group, Sundeep 
Waslekar, argued in his book The Final Settlement, that there had been a change in the 
Pakistan Indus waters policy.
315
 He argued that the Pakistan government was not mainly 
interested in Kashmir because of political, religious or ideological reason – Pakistan’s core 
issue was to secure their water supply. Several scholars were surprised by Waslekar’s 
suggestion, and questioned why water was allegedly so important to Pakistan when their 
water supply was safeguarded in the IWT.
316
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Waslekar connected the Pakistani water policy to the rule of Pervez Musharraf. 
According to Waslekar, Musharraf had decided long before his coup in 1999 that the Indus 
River system should be Pakistan’s core issue. As a student at the Royal College of Defense 
Studies in London in 1990, Musharraf published a paper arguing that the rivers of Kashmir 
were the key to the future conflict between India and Pakistan. Musharraf pointed out that 
Pakistan’s economy and integrity depended on the Indus River system. If Waslekar was right 
about Musharraf’s intention, the Baglihar dispute was more important to Pakistan than any of 
the Indian experts had imagined. Musharraf’s plan was supposedly to get control of the whole 
Chenab River. Musharraf believed that it was possible to resolve the Kashmir conflict, and the 
Chenab Formula was the answer, Waslekar wrote.
317
  
The Chenab Formula suggested that Kashmir should be divided between India and 
Pakistan along the line of the Chenab River, thereby giving Pakistan actual control of the 
Indus and the Jhelum River, and the northern banks of the Chenab River.
318
 It was similar to 
the Dixon Plan, named after the UN representative Sir Owen Dixon who proposed a solution 
to the Kashmir dispute in 1950. Dixon suggested that the Jammu region should be split in 
two, and that a plebiscite would decide whether the Kashmir Valley would become a part of 
Pakistan or India. Pakistan had accepted this solution, but the Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru refused.
319
 Did Musharraf really believe it was possible that India would 
accept a plan they refused 50 years earlier? 
If Waslekar’s conclusion was right, Pakistan was not only interested in the Kashmir 
Valley, but also wanted access to the Chenab River basin in the Jammu region. If Pakistan 
could control the upper parts of Chenab, along with the upper parts of the Jhelum and Indus 
River, Pakistan would have secured their water supply, their life-line. Waslekar included a 
numerous collection of quotes by Pakistani newspaper editors, local politicians and military 
officers to support his thesis. Waslekar’s sources expressed fear of the consequences of Indian 
hydro plants on the western rivers, and claimed that they would eventually turn the Sindh 
province into a desert. According to these sources, Pakistan should therefore demand control 
of the Indus, Jhelum and especially the Chenab River.  
Waslekar concluded that Pakistan was neither interested in self-determination for the 
people of Kashmir nor annexing the state for political reasons. Kashmir-expert Robert G. 
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Wirsing called The Final Settlement an “unusually provocative book” because it claimed that 
Pakistan treated the Kashmir conflict as a war with one purpose: to secure Pakistan’s water 
supply.
320
 Waslekar wrote that: 
 
A conflict over land between the people of Kashmir and the government of India will 
soon become a thing of the past. On the other hand, a water war between Kashmir and 




He argued that there was a connection between water availability in Pakistan and terrorism in 
J&K. The leadership of Pervez Musharraf allegedly played a significant role in this agitation 
and violence over water. Before Musharraf came to power, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy in brief 
was that the state should belong to Pakistan because it had a Muslim majority. Waslekar 
argued that Musharraf brought change, recognizing the allocation of the Indus River system 




The link between Pakistani leadership and the Indus River 
Indian expert on Pakistan, Samuel Baid, agreed with Waslekar: Musharraf played a decisive 
role in Indus Basin hydropolitics in the 2000s. Baid added that there was a parallel between 
the military leaderships of General Ayub Khan in Pakistan from 1958-1969 and that of 
Musharraf from 1999: 
 
In October 1958, General Ayub Khan turned his attention to the rivers of Jammu and 
Kashmir which, he said, were indispensable for the economic survival of his country. 
He made a failed attempt in 1965 to capture this State. After Ayub, General Pervez 
Musharraf is the second military ruler for whom Kashmir is the core issue not because 
of any ideology but because of Pakistan’s water needs. […] Both Ayub and General 
Musharraf made water from Kashmir a condition for peace with India. Like Ayub, 





If Waslekar and Baid were right, it was not merely water scarcity that increased the chance of 
conflict over water in the Indus Basin. India also had to consider the military leadership and 
personal opinion of General Musharraf.  
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Ashok Swain had earlier suggested that the Kargil Conflict might have been connected 
to Pakistan’s water issues.324 Baid went further, asserting that it was Musharraf who ordered 
the Pakistani troop movement during the Kargil Conflict, in order to get control over the 
rivers of Kashmir.  
While Waslekar and Baid argued that Musharraf had always viewed water as 
Pakistan’s core issue, Verghese wrote that water had not been one of Musharraf’s 
prioritizations before 2005.
325
 A third view was presented by Gazdar, who agreed that 
Musharraf had brought change in Pakistan's Kashmir policy, but argued that Musharraf had 
neglected water issues. Gazdar also drew parallels between Ayub Khan and Pervez 
Musharraf, arguing that Ayub Khan and Musharraf both ignored the importance of water.  
 
Punjab province vs. Sindh 
Gazdar suggested that Musharraf’s home in the Punjab province was of importance. Many of 
the Pakistani leaders during the IWT-negotiations in the 1950s came from Punjab, and Gazdar 
argued that these leaders were satisfied with the IWT as long as the Punjab province got 
enough water. Gazdar wrote that the situation was similar in the 2000s. As long as Punjab got 
enough water for irrigation, Musharraf would not complain. The downstream Sindh province 
had long suffered from decreasing water supply. In the 2000s, also the Punjab province was 
severely affected by the increasing water scarcity. Gazdar argued that the scarcity in Punjab 
was the reason Musharraf had decided that water was Pakistan’s core issue. According to 
Gazdar, “military governments have been disdainful of Pakistan’s federal political structure, 
which they regard as a source of disunity and weakness.”326  
Gazdar also suggested that Ayub Khan might have had “personal interest in the 
finalization of the [IWT], in the face of technical and diplomatic advice”.327 This critique 
towards the interest of Ayub Khan was supported by Bashir A. Malik, who was a technical 
advisor to the Pakistani under the negotiations.
328
 During the Pakistani presidential elections 
in 1964, Fatima Jinnah
329
 accused Ayub Khan of signing a treaty that gave away the water 
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Indus, Jhelum and Chenab permanently. Ayub Khan defended himself and the IWT by stating 
that he got Rupees 900 crores in exchange for the rivers.
330
  
If Swain, Waslekar and Baid’s assumptions about Musharraf, the Chenab Formula and 
the Kargil Conflict were right, a water conflict between India and Pakistan seemed more 
likely than ever. Verghese’s argument that Musharraf had suddenly changed the Pakistan 
water policy in 2005 lacked empirical evidence. While Verghese, Sinha, and Saran had tried 
to delegitimize Pakistan’s take on the Baglihar dispute, Waslekar’s study showed that 
Pakistani leaders thought the Baglihar dispute was extremely important to the Pakistani water 
supply. If Baglihar was that important, would Musharraf consider war if the dispute was not 
resolved, as Qazi Javed Ashraf had suggested? On the other hand, the ongoing bilateral talks 
between India and Pakistan seemed to show that Musharraf was prepared to settle Indo-
Pakistani issues in a diplomatic manner.  
 
Improving water management in the Indus Basin  
There were three reasons why India considered abrogating the IWT in 2002.
 331
  First, India 
could use it as a strategic weapon against Pakistan, punishing Pakistan after the terror attacks 
in India in 2001. Secondly, the J&K Legislative Assembly demanded a review of the IWT, 
because they believed that the treaty hindered them from economic development. Thirdly, 
India needed to flush silt and water from their hydro plants on the western rivers in order to 
operate them more efficient, and this would violate the IWT. 
When Pakistan requested the World Bank to intervene in the Baglihar dispute in 2005, 
the debate about abrogation and renegotiation of the IWT emerged again. There were clearly 
issues in Indus Basin hydropolitics which India and Pakistan struggled to cope with, even 
though they still cooperated under the IWT. The Indian experts criticized how the Pakistani 
government dealt with the Baglihar dispute, but they provided little that could inform what 
course India could take. One of the exceptions was Verghese, who suggested that the IWT 
should be renegotiating and that India (and Pakistan) should construct more hydro plants on 
the Indus Rivers. 
Verghese advocated that India and Pakistan to exploit the water resources in the Indus 
Basin further because that would benefit both nations economically. He also argued that India 
and Pakistan should maximize the conservation storage as a precautionary measure, because 
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of increasing chances of devastating floods: “with climate change, glaciers are in retreat both 
in the Karakoram […] as well as the Tibetan Plateau.”332 The glacier meltdown in the region 
was more uncertain than Verghese believed,
333
 but he advocated precautionary measures for 
the common good of both countries. 
 
Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty? 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Verghese provided policy recommendations in order to 
improve political relations and water management in the Indus Basin. In 2005, Verghese 
elaborated on an idea, the ‘Indus-II’, which he first had presented in 1997.334 Verghese had 
earlier argued against abrogation of the IWT because the IWT had served a useful purpose, 




Verghese recommended water management in the Indus Basin could be greatly 
improved if the IWT was renegotiated, building on the foundations of the IWT.
336
 According 
to Verghese, there was room for improvement in the understanding of the IWT provisions: it 
was possible to exploit the waters in the western rivers to a greater extent to the benefit of 
both India and Pakistan: 
 
Pakistan cannot continue to deny India its limited entitlement in the Western rivers 
and also freeze all further development if it wants to grasp what could be a far larger 





Verghese argued that India and Pakistan management of the Indus River system should be 
based on IWRM-principles such as basin-wise planning and joint management. He thought 
that an Indus-II could be an important contribution to a peace process in the region. His 
reasoning was simple: Exploiting the water resources in the western rivers further through 
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joint management would benefit both countries economically. It would especially be good for 
J&K and the provinces of Pakistan that suffered from lack of storage and flood mitigation. 
Economic development was important in order to create peace. 
In 1997, Verghese had written that an Indus-II would merely be possible if Indo-
Pakistani relations improved. In 2002, he glimpsed a faint hope of this. In 2005, the seemingly 
improved Indo-Pakistan relations in 2004 made him slightly more optimistic, despite the 
recent events concerning Baglihar. He wrote that: 
 
Indus-II needs to be fed into the current peace process as a means both of defusing 
current political strains over [IWT] and insuring against climate change. It could 
reinforce the basis for a lasting solution to the J&K question by helping transform 





Professor PR Chari at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, in New Delhi, agreed with 
Verghese that negotiating an Indus-II “would be a huge Confidence Building Measure. It 
would engage both countries in a regional economic integration process.”339 If no steps were 
taken, Chari feared that the Indus Basin hydropolitics would be characterized by conflict in 
the future. 
 
Water sharing is increasingly becoming a source of tension that will grow as demands 
increase and supplies decrease. There is a growing consciousness of the scarcity of 
water as in the next two decades we might be witnessing water wars in the world. The 
link between water management and environmental degradation needs to be 




The Indian experts Suba Chandran
341
 and M.S. Menon
342
 also adopted Verghese’s idea of a 
renegotiated treaty. Ramaswamy R. Iyer however, did not believe in it. 
 
IWRM-principles are unrealistic  
Iyer agreed that renegotiation was theoretically a good idea, but he did not think that it was a 
realistic solution. He agreed that a joint management of the Indus River system would have 
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been a better solution for the ecology and the economy of the region, but he argued that the 
political climate made it difficult: 
 
No one would wish to deprecate such a vision. However, there is a basic difficulty 
here. If the [IWT] had been a constructive, cooperative water-sharing treaty, it could 
have been built upon and taken further; but is a negative, partitioning treaty, a coda to 




As he had written earlier, Iyer did not think of the IWT as an optimal treaty. But he believed 
that trying to renegotiate the treaty would reopen old issues that were settled when the IWT 
was signed:  
 
India cannot expect to restrict the re-negotiation to the western rivers; the eastern 
rivers will also be a part of the agenda. If India wants to seek more rights on the 
western rivers, it may have to give Pakistan some rights on the eastern rivers. Is that 
feasible at this stage? Would that not open a Pandora’s Box?344 
 
Iyer suggested that renegotiation would lead to conflict over water issues. The next best 
solution, according to Iyer, would be a sharing on each of the six rivers. This could have been 
possible if it was addressed during the negotiations in the 1950s, Iyer wrote, but it would also 
have caused a lot of Indo-Pakistani disputes. He therefore recommended the Indian 
government to “leave thing as they are, and hope that with improving political relations a 
more reasonable and constructive spirit will prevail in the future than in the past.”345 
 Most experts agreed that both countries could improve their water management 
unilaterally, especially by making the irrigation in the region more efficient.
346
 An article 
published in Water International in 2009 argued a position between Iyer’s and Verghese’s 
suggestion: 
 
There is scope for unilateral action (not joint action) by India and Pakistan for raising 
financing to build infrastructure for alleviating water scarcity and preventing pollution. 
[…] addressing those issues could prevent future conflict and improve people’s lives 
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The article suggested that India and Pakistan could use the permanent commission under the 
IWT and the water quality provisions in Articles IV and VIII to address the water pollution in 
the Indus Rivers. It also suggested that India and Pakistan should cooperate on seeking 




The ideal way to implement improved water management, if IWRM-principles are 
accepted, is through joint management of a river basin. But joint management was described 
as unrealistic by most experts apart from Verghese. Sundeep Waslekar agreed that joint 
management was “necessary to evade the impending water crisis in the subcontinent,” but 
added that “the integrated development approach is Utopian. It is only possible with a 
paradigm shift in mindset and complete end to hostilities, both physical and psychological.”349 
Zawahri argued that states in general were not likely to adopt an integrated approach because 
it conflicted with their political sovereignty. The Indo-Pakistani relations made joint 
management even less realistic.  
The first debate about renegotiation in 2002 was closely related to the IWT-criticism 
in J&K. In 2005, observers from J&K were still making complaints.   
 
The Kashmiri view 
 
“The treaty is unfair. It gave all the rivers that flow through Jammu and Kashmir to 
Pakistan without taking into account the interests of the people of the state."  




“Objections from Jammu and Kashmir are emotional” (Indus Waters Expert, BG 
Verghese, 21 June 2005)351 
 
The previous chapter explored attitudes in J&K from the late 1990s. Officials in J&K believed 
that the IWT had favored Pakistan, and that the treaty strained development in J&K. Waslekar 
and a few other experts partly supported these claims.
352
 Waslekar argued that J&K could 
potentially benefit greatly from an abrogation of the IWT. Then J&K would be free to 
develop their hydroelectricity potential. However, Waslekar also added that “abrogating the 
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treaty is an extreme step, which may be taken under coercive circumstances,” and that 
renegotiating the treaty with Pakistan would be necessary to avoid conflict. Waslekar 
concluded therefore that India should not abrogate the IWT.  He repeated what Iyer said 
earlier: abrogation would be criticized by the World Bank, the international community, and 
India’s other neighboring countries, and India should not risk these consequences.353  
Moderate separatist, and leader of the J&K Council for Human Rights,
354
 
Syed Nazir Gilani agreed with most other commentators in J&K that the IWT had obstructed 
economic development in J&K. He questioned Pakistan’s legal right or moral right to the 
water resources in the state. Kashmiri Professor, Kulbushan Warikoo, supported Gilani’s 
assertion, and argued that the IWT should be reviewed: 
 
The Treaty which  has been in force for more than 45 years, has added to the economic 
woes of the people of upstream Jammu and Kashmir State by depriving them of the 
legitimate right to full usage of Jhelum, Chenab and Indus waters for hydro-electric 




According to Warikoo, a new treaty should be modified so it addressed the changes in J&K 
since the IWT signed in 1960. Neither Warikoo nor Gilani mentioned that India had not 
utilized all the water in the western rivers the IWT allowed them, but they contended that the 
IWT greatly benefited Pakistan.  
Experts from Pakistan and J&K both argued that the IWT was unfair to them. The 
different sides have aimed to delegitimize the other, and focused merely on their own 
interests. Verghese criticized the perspectives from J&K for being “emotional”.356 Peter 
Mollinga’s description of the debates about water in South Asia as “dichotomous and 
polarized” seems to fit the different perspectives in the Baglihar dispute.357 A study of the 
IWT-discourse in media found that Pakistani newspaper articles often described the IWT as 
“unfair” and that it was the cause of water shortage in Pakistan.358  
 There were several experts at the time who advocated a renegotiation of the IWT, but 
Verghese was the only expert who recognized that both Pakistan and J&K would have to 
benefit from a renegotiation. Negotiating a new treaty which both J&K and Pakistan could 
benefit from would imply IWRM-principles such as joint management of the river system, but 
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the “polarized and dichotomous” perspectives from Pakistan and J&K did not bring much 





In August 2006, the neutral expert in the Baglihar dispute, Raymond Lafitte, stated that his 
verdict on the issue could be expected late in 2006. In the meantime, the Chenab River 
demonstrated its destructive force - independent of dams and hydropolitics - when flash 
floods severely affected the Jammu Region in India. In the Kathua district, six people were 





Expectations to the verdict 
In 2006, the Indian experts Rajesh Sinha, Verghese and Iyer believed that there still was a 
small hope of that India and Pakistan could reach a decision without waiting for Lafitte’s 
verdict, but they were proven wrong. Officials from both countries stated beforehand that they 
were prepared to accept the neutral expert’s decision.361 Iyer said, “there is no question of not 
accepting.”362 He argued that the involvement of a third party was not worrying, because the 
role of the neutral expert in such matter was described in detail in the IWT.
363
 
The neutral expert, Raymond Lafitte, had given no hints about his decision, hence 
there were much uncertainty concerning the verdict. Even though both countries’ officials 
expected that Lafitte would announce “a fair verdict”, few experts dared to suggest what the 
final outcome of the dispute would be. Iyer believed that anything was possible. There was 
also a possibility that Lafitte had decided that he could not solve the issue, and would request 
that the dispute was to be dealt with by a Court of Arbitration.
364
 The Indian NGO, South Asia 
Network on Dams, Rivers & People, was one of the few Indian observers who tipped an 
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outcome: that Lafitte’s background suggested he was a supporter of large dams, and that he 
therefore would accept India’s design of Baglihar.365  
Most expectations among the Indian experts suggested that the involvement of a third 
party in the Baglihar dispute was not viewed as a hydropolitical crisis. As described above, 
Verghese argued earlier that Pakistan objected to Baglihar in order to obstruct India’s 
influence in J&K. Pakistani observers argued that the Baglihar was a core issue for Pakistan, 
but Indian experts such as Iyer and Saran had ridiculed this argument.
366
 Indian experts 
attempted to delegitimize the Pakistani perspective, but these attempts also led to increased 
attention towards the Pakistani attitudes. From 2005, Indian experts began to recognize 
increasingly that it was necessary to consider the attitudes in Pakistan if India should be able 
to cooperate peacefully over the Indus River system in the future.  
Pakistan’s reasons for objecting to Baglihar were much debated. Pakistani 
commentators seemed to value water to such an extent that Baglihar was a matter of national 
security. This created uncertainty around whether Pakistan would eventually accept the 
verdict of the neutral expert. The Indian experts recommended the Indian government to 
accept the verdict, regardless of the outcome. But what if Pakistan was not happy with the 
decision? Opposition leaders in Pakistan had argued that war was an option if the neutral 
expert accepted the projected design of Baglihar.
367
 
Not everyone concerned with hydropolitics in the Indus Basin waited patiently for the 
Baglihar verdict. Even though India had continued constructing Baglihar; there were protests 
in J&K because of the Indian government’s alleged reluctance to invest in hydroelectric 
power in the state. On 6 February 2007, activists from J&K staged a dharna (a peaceful 
demonstration) to protest against the IWT. The activists demanded, as officials from the 






In February 2007, the neutral expert in the Baglihar dispute, Swiss civil engineer Raymond 
Lafitte, announced his decision. At that point, the Baglihar project was almost complete.  
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The verdict can be briefly summed up in the following: Pakistan’s demands for ungated 
spillway and decreased maximum discharge capacity were denied, but India had to lower the 
dam’s height and decrease the live storage capacity. Lafitte also determined that the turbine’s 
intake level should be placed at a higher level.
369
  
Both countries accepted the verdict, and the involvement of a neutral expert appeared 
to be successful. Lafitte was appointed May 10, 2005 and presented his decision February 12, 
2007. While the PIC had discussed the Baglihar issue in intervals from 1992 till 2005 without 
reaching an agreement, Lafitte had resolved the dispute in 21 months.
370
 Although India and 
Pakistan seemed to be on the brink of conflict over water during the Baglihar dispute, both 
countries had more or less patently abided the neutral expert’s findings. The Indian experts 
who recommended that India kept calm over Pakistan’s request for a neutral expert, appeared 
to have been giving sound advice.
371
 
The Baglihar was the first hydropolitical issue that India and Pakistan were not able to 
solve bilaterally, and officials and opposition leaders in Pakistan and J&K had criticized the 
IWT and believed that the Indus Basin needed of hydropolitical change. Yet, after 21 months 
of evaluation, the neutral expert managed to find a solution that both countries consented. 
 
Reactions to the verdict 
Even though Pakistan originally claimed that Baglihar’s pondage far exceeded the IWT-
regulations, they eventually accepted Lafitte’s verdict which ruled in favor for India’s gated 
spillways on a low level of the dam. The then Pakistani Minister for Water and Power, Liaqat 
Ali Jatoi, stated in an interview that the final report was “good news for Pakistan”, and India's 




Both India and Pakistan had to accept adjustments to their claims, which for India’s 
part led to an estimated loss of 9% in energy production. Pakistan had to accept that India 
increased its capacity to control the flow of the Chenab River. The Times of India reported 
that “the ruling has been fashioned in way so that both countries can claim a victory.”373 
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Verghese claimed that the verdict, and Pakistan’s reaction to it, proved him right, i.e. 
that Pakistan's reason for objecting Baglihar was political. He wrote that: 
 
The Salal and Baglihar cases and contemporary hysteria reflect Pakistan’s propensity 
to resort to horror scenarios and grandstanding, suggesting political more than genuine 




If Pakistani officials really were happy the verdict, then Verghese had a point. The 
adjustments India had to make to the design of Baglihar were minor, and if Pakistan were 
concerned about the Indian control of the river flow, there were little reason to celebrate 
Lafitte’s decision. 
Despite Pakistan’s immediate happy reaction to the verdict, there were signs that all 
was not well. Indian journalist, Masood Hussain, wrote that contrary to what the victory 
celebrations in Pakistan suggested, “Islamabad has lost on the most crucial point it wanted to 
erase from the J&K flagship power project's design - the gated spillways.”375 An Indian senior 
engineer similarly questioned how Pakistan could reconcile to what they feared the most: 
India constructing a dam with gated spillways on the western rivers. Power minister in J&K, 
Nawang Zora, described the verdict as “a slap on Pakistan’s face.”376 Was Pakistan really 
happy with the ruling?  
Although the official statements from Pakistan repeatedly confirmed that they 
accepted the verdict, Pakistani media and opposition leaders discussed whether Pakistan 
should appeal and request a Court of Arbitration to assess the Baglihar issue.
377
 There were 
several observers who argued that Lafitte had ruled in favor of India,
378
 and most Indian 
experts agreed. Iyer wrote that:  
 
On the whole, India has reason to be somewhat more satisfied than Pakistan with these 





Verghese and the Indian Minister for Water Resources, Saifuddin Soz, said that the verdict 
clearly went in India’s favor because it required them to make only minor changes.380  
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 John Briscoe, a former Senior Water Advisor for the World Bank, agreed that Lafitte’s 
verdict favored India, but criticized how Lafitte defined “live storage”, or pondage in the 
decision. The pondage of a dam is decided by the amount of water stored behind a dam which 
the operator of the dam can manage. The IWT sets a limit to the size of the pondage on Indian 
hydro plants on the western rivers. Pakistan claimed that Baglihar’s pondage exceeded this. 
According to Briscoe, Lafitte’s definition of live storage was unusual: 
 
The neutral expert, applying considerable semantic subtlety, essentially argued that 
live storage was not the same as “manipulable storage”. He argued that only storage 
that could be used for the operational purpose of generating power constituted “live 
storage”. So if India was creating more “manipulable storage” on the grounds that this 
was necessary for silt management, then, in the judgment of the neutral expert, this 
was not live storage and should be allowed. This finding would only make sense if 
Pakistan’s concern in the treaty was to define exactly where the power outlets could be 
in the Indian dams (which it never was and is not). But it makes no sense if Pakistan’s 





In the verdict, the neutral expert Raymond Lafitte explained why he accepted that India 
increased the amount of manipulable water, made possible by the low-level gated spillway: 
 
In 1960, when the Treaty was signed, the phenomenon of reservoir sedimentation was 
not recognized everywhere to its full degree of significance. It was only 20 years later, 
in 1980 that the concept of an integrated reservoir sedimentation management began to 




Pakistan was mainly concerned with India’s ability to control the river flow. Lafitte, on the 
other hand prioritized silt-control. Briscoe stated that Lafitte’s decision was reinterpretation of 
the IWT which removed, 
 
the fundamental physical protection (limits in manipulable storage) which Pakistan 
had against the creation of an Indian ability to seriously manipulate the timing of flows 
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This was a huge blow to Pakistan because it allowed India more control over the Chenab 





Would the Baglihar Verdict set precedent? 
Since this was the first time a third party had rules in an Indo-Pakistani water dispute, it was 
believed that the verdict would set a precedent for Indian hydro plants on the western rivers. 
Although a decision in one dispute under the IWT applies only to that specific case, it would, 
in the words of Iyer, “be absurd to adopt divergent principles in different cases, the decision 
in one case will tend to become a precedent for others.”385 Verghese wrote, “Pakistan invoked 
the Neutral Expert in the Baglihar case and that matter was resolved and significant principles 
laid down for future guidance.”386 If Lafitte’s decision set up precedent, it allowed India to 
construct gated spillways on future run-of-the-river projects. Chief Minister of J&K, Ghulam 
Nabi Azad, hoped that the Baglihar verdict would clear the way for more hydro projects in 
J&K. Azad said, "Jammu and Kashmir is the real beneficiary, as it can use this power and sell 
it too,” and described it as a “win-win situation for both India and Pakistan”,387 without 
actually elaborating on how Pakistan would benefit from Baglihar.  
While most Indian experts were satisfied with Lafitte’s decision, Former Secretary on 
the Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, M.S. Menon, called the Baglihar 
verdict “a tragedy”.388 Menon believed that the additional costs due to the modifications in 
design were not acceptable, and India should therefore not accept Pakistan’s repeated 
objections to their hydro projects. India should instead insist on a review of the IWT. And if 
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In the aftermath of Baglihar 
The Baglihar dispute was resolved and India could complete the Baglihar with Pakistan’s 
approval. If the Indian experts’ assumptions were right, the decision would have precedent-
setting importance. The verdict was celebrated as a victory in India, and especially in J&K 
where officials now hoped to construct run-of-the-river project with gated spillways on the 
western rivers. Pakistani officials also expressed some satisfaction with the ruling. The 
Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, said the Baglihar verdict was a "ray of hope" that 
both countries could resolve disputes in a civilized manner.
390
 President Pervez Musharraf 
referred to the Baglihar dispute as an example of the progress in Indo-Pakistani relations, and 
stated that resolving the Kashmir conflict could be next.
391
  
However, despite these reassuringly joyous statements, the Baglihar dispute and the 
verdict had its downsides. The costs of the project had risen 20% due to delays, partly caused 
by Pakistan’s objections to the project. The costs of Baglihar became much higher than at 
most other similar Indian hydro plants. In order to become cost-benefit efficient, Baglihar 
would have to generate electricity for several decades.
392
 
In addition, Pakistan soon after the Baglihar verdict announced that they might request 
a Court of Arbitration to settle the dispute over the Kishenganga hydroelectric project.
393
 
Hence, it became unclear whether the Baglihar verdict would actually set a precedent, since 




Other hydropolitical issues also arose in the period shortly after the Baglihar verdict. 
The Pakistani Indus Commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah criticized how J&K dealt with water 
pollution in the Indus River system. Shah also expressed concern about the water level in the 
western rivers, “particularly during the winters when only filth flows to Pakistan”.395 Water 
experts in J&K suggested joint Indo-Pakistani efforts to deal with the pollution in the western 
rivers. The Pakistan newspaper, The Daily Times, suggested additional reasons for pollution 
in the rivers: 
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Jhelum is known for draining dirt, garbage and sludge over the years and during 





Most of these issues were brought up at the PIC meeting in June 2007. Pakistani 
commissioner Shah also formally objected to the Indian Uri-II hydro project, on the Jhelum 
River. Although the design of Uri-II was similar to Baglihar, Shah argued that gated spillways 
were unnecessary at Uri-II, because Jhelum did not carry as much silt as Chenab did. Pakistan 
therefore requested India to stop work on Uri-II, and again threatened to request a Court of 
Arbitration to resolve the dispute.
397
 At that point, it seemed as the Baglihar verdict was 
irrelevant in other water disputes. 
 However, India and Pakistan continued talks, and finally agreed on the design on Uri-
II during the PIC meeting in 2010. Jamaat Ali Shah declared that Pakistan would not object to 




Pakistan's acceptance of these hydro plants on the western rivers verified somewhat that they 
found the Baglihar acceptable. The then Pakistani Indus Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah 
stated in several interviews afterwards that disputes under the IWT had been, and would 




Filling the Baglihar dam 
When Indian started constructing Baglihar, they planned to complete the project by 
2005/2006.
400
 After several delays, and increasing costs, Chief Minister of J&K, Ghulam 
Nabi Azad, declared in late 2007 that Baglihar was soon completed.
401
  
However, in order to generate electricity, the hydro plant needed to be filled with 
water, and Pakistani officials were worried that this filling the dam might cause a period of 
drought in the Chenab River valley in Pakistan. Pakistani officials therefore wanted to inspect 
Baglihar before it was commissioned, in order to check that India had made the adjustment to 
the design that was agreed upon.
402
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Baglihar went operational in October 2008, and at the inaugural ceremony, Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Sing emphasized how much the dam meant for the development 
of J&K. He also announced that the J&K government and the State Power Development 
Corporation, NHPC and the Power Trading Corporation would cooperate on constructing 
several other hydro projects in J&K in the future.
403
 
 While the IWT had long been a symbol of peaceful water-sharing relations, the 
completion of Baglihar signalized that India was willing to sacrifice the good reputation of 
IWT in order to further develop hydropower projects in J&K. As long as Pakistan eventually 
accepted the Indian hydro projects on the western rivers, it seemed as a successful policy. The 
criticism from J&K towards the Indian government and the IWT became less frequent after 
the Baglihar was commissioned. 
Immediately after Baglihar was commissioned, Pakistani officials complained that the 
filling of the dam was not in line with the IWT provisions. The Pakistani Indus 
Commissioner, Jamat Ali Shah, claimed that the water discharge in the Chenab River was 
only one-fifth of minimum flow in early October 2007, and that this had, “created a drought-
like situation in vast stretches” on the Pakistani side of the border.404 Pakistan’s President Asif 
Ali Zardari said, “Pakistan would be paying a very high price for India’s move to block 
Pakistan’s water supply from the Chenab River”, and that Pakistan wanted compensation for 




An article in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn pointed out the importance of the Chenab 
River water, “Pakistan must understand that there is no substitute for this precious 
commodity,”406 and the journalist suggested that Pakistan needed more than just 
compensation, “India should be asked to release water from its own share to save the Indus 
delta which has its own importance for keeping the regional ecosystem healthy,” and this 
could only be achieved by renegotiating the IWT.
407
 An article in Daily Times called the 
drought in Pakistan a water crisis, and warned that if the crisis was not soon resolved under 
the IWT, “the water situation may become extremely dangerous”.408  
President of Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid, Chaudhry Shujaat warned that the 
situation might lead to an Indo-Pakistan war. Quoted in Daily Times, Shujaat claimed that the 
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Indus River system was already causing bloodshed between India and Pakistan, linking the 
fighting in Kashmir securing access to the Indus River system: “mujahedeen in Kashmir are 
in fact fighting for Pakistan.”409 According to Shujaat, there would be no strengthening of 
Indo-Pakistani relations before the water crisis was dealt with. 
 
Water and terrorism 
The Baglihar resolution did not put an end to the tense hydropolitical situation in the Indus 
Basin. The criticism from J&K became less frequent, but commentators in Pakistan 
increasingly presented Indian interference on the Indus River system as a threat to their 
national security.  
 26 November 2008, ten Pakistani members of the terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-
Tayiba and Jamaat-u-Dawa killed 163 people and wounded 300 in terror attacks in 
Mumbai.
410
 The Mumbai attacks worsened Indo-Pakistani relations severely.
411
 The leader of 
Jamaat-u-Dawa, Hafiz Saeed was accused of organizing the attacks.
412
  Saeed later led protest 
rallies in Pakistan, shouting slogans such as “liberate Kashmir to secure water”, and 
threatening India with, “water flows or blood”.413  
 Saeed was among several Pakistani observers who increasingly blamed India for 
stealing the water in the western rivers in the first two years after the Baglihar verdict.
414
 
Leaders of Lashkar-e-Tayiba called for jihad to liberate Kashmir and Pakistan from the “water 
terrorism” of India.415 Pakistani newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt encouraged the Pakistan 
government to take action against the alleged water theft of India, stating that: “Pakistan 
should convey to India that a war is possible on the issue of water and this time war will be a 
nuclear one.”416 Iyer reported that, 
 
’India is stealing Pakistan's water’ has become a familiar cry at the popular level, 
echoed in the media, picked up by the jihadists, and acquiesced in at the official and 
expert levels through silence in Pakistan.
417
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Verghese denounced the utterances as “totally irresponsible” and “baseless rhetoric”.418 
 At the annual PIC meeting in 2009, the Pakistani Indus Commissioner, Jamaat Ali 
Shah, complained about the filling of Baglihar, and objected to the Indian hydro projects 
Kishenganga and Uri-II projects on the western rivers.
419
 However, Shah was afterwards 
accused in Pakistan for not being tough enough when negotiating with India.
420
  
The PIC-meeting seemed similar to many of the previous meetings. The Pakistani 
commissioner complained about, or objected Indian hydroelectric project on the western 
rivers, while the Indian counterpart tried to assure that projects were in line with the IWT. It 
did not seem like the Baglihar verdict had set precedent, as the Indian experts had expected. 
India and Pakistan continued discussing the different issues though, and finally agreed 
on the design of Uri-II during the PIC meeting in 2010. Jamaat Ali Shah declared that 
Pakistan would not object to Uri-II and another Indian small run-of-the-river hydro project, 
Chutak, on the western rivers.
421
 Pakistan's acceptance of these hydro plants on the western 
rivers verified somewhat that they found the design of Baglihar and similar – but smaller - 
projects acceptable. Ali Shah also agreed to drop the complaint about the initial filling the 
Baglihar dam. Expert on water law, Salman M.A. Salman, argued that even though the 
Baglihar dispute had taken years to settle, the impartial and just manner of the process could 
be a standard for future differences under the IWT.
422
 Jamaat Ali Shah stated in several 
interviews afterwards that disputes under the IWT had been, and would continue to be 





This chapter has outlined the hydropolitical development in the Indus Basin and the Indian 
experts’ attitudes towards the Baglihar dispute from 2005 till 2008. Even though India and 
Pakistan were never close to reaching an agreement before 2005, and Pakistani officials had 
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warned that they considered taking the dispute to a neutral expert, several Indian observers 
were surprised when Pakistan requested a neutral expert to interfere in the Baglihar dispute.  
Water, and water sharing with India, seemed to be an increasingly important issue for 
Pakistan in the 2000s, but it was not before 2005 that Indian experts began analyzing the 
Pakistani Indus Basin policy. Indian experts such as Waslekar, Verghese and Iyer examined 
Pakistani motives for taking the Baglihar dispute to a neutral expert. According to Verghese, 
Pakistan objected to Baglihar in order to hinder Indian investment in J&K, and thereby 
weakening the Government of India’s position in J&K. Waslekar connected the Pakistani 
Indus policy to the presidency of Pervez Musharraf, arguing that the Indus River system had 
become Pakistan’s “core issue” in the 2000s. Iyer, on the other and, denied that water could 
be Pakistan’s core issue, because the IWT safe-guarded Pakistan’s water supply.  
The neutral expert, Raymond Lafitte, decided that India could use the gated spillways 
on Baglihar, thereby reinterpreting the regulations of IWT, grounded on new technological 
knowledge about sediment management. Even though some Pakistani officials stated initially 
that they were satisfied with the verdict, it was generally accepted that the verdict favored the 
Indian claim. 
Indian experts expected that the ruling in the case would set up precedent in later 
hydropolitical disputes. The solution to the disputes concerning two smaller Indian hydro 
projects on the western rivers: Uri-II and Chutak, in 2010, might have been affected by the 
Baglihar verdict. However, the much more important Kishenganga dispute, in terms of size 
and diversions of water, seemed to suggest that the Baglihar verdict would be largely 
irrelevant in later cases. 
 
Epilogue: the Kishenganga dispute 
Although the period of focus in this thesis is 1999 till 2008, it is necessary to comment on 
certain aspects of the hydropolitical development in the Indus Basin after this period. In 2007, 
India began constructing the Kishenganga hydroelectric project on Neelum River, a tributary 
to the Jhelum River. Kishenganga was designed to generate electricity, and divert water from 
the Neelum River in to the Wular Lake before it joined the Jhelum River.  
Pakistan objected to Kishenganga because it diverted water, and because it was 
designed with gated spillways on a low level of the dam. The dispute was in several ways 
similar to the Baglihar dispute, and the case provided an example of what effect the Baglihar 
verdict had on later disputes under the IWT. 
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Pakistan took the Kishenganga dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 
Hague, in July 2010. In February 2013, the PCA ruled in favor of India on the point of 
constructing Kishenganga and that it could divert water, in a partial award.
424
 This was 
initially regarded as victory in Indian press, and by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
425
  
If the Baglihar verdict had set precedent in future disputes, India could have 
constructed hydroelectric projects with low-level gated spillways, enabling silt-flushing an 
thereby increasing their live storage capacity on the western rivers. But the PCAs decision 
contradicted the neutral expert’s verdict on the issue of gated spillways, deciding that India 
was not allowed to construct gated spillways on the dam.  
Briscoe claimed that the Baglihar verdict allowed for new knowledge and technology 
on sediment management and thereby ignored Pakistan’s fear of Indian control over the 
western rivers. The partial award in the Kishenganga case however, “restored the central 
protection – put into question by the Baglihar finding – which Pakistan had acquired when 
Nehru and Ayub Khan signed the IWT in 1960.”426 
One of the apparent reasons why the Baglihar verdict was such an important issue in 
Indus Basin hydropolitics, was that it was the first dispute a third party was requested to 
resolve. It was generally accepted that this would mean that Baglihar would have precedent 
setting importance. The hydropolitical development in the Indus Basin from 2008-2013 in 
general, and the Kishenganga dispute specifically, suggested that the Baglihar verdict had 
little influence in other water disputes. That does not imply that the Baglihar dispute was of 
small importance. The Baglihar dispute will continue to be disputed, as long as the IWT 
remains unchanged. In the words of Briscoe, “of course, Pakistan will continue to object to 
every project on the Indus Jhelum or Chenab in Indian-held Kashmir”.427  
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This thesis is a work in intellectual history, and throughout the thesis I have studied the 
writings of Indian water experts, and ideas and arguments they provided within the context of 
Indus Basin hydropolitics during the Baglihar dispute, 1999-2008.  
The Baglihar dispute was essentially a conflict between the Government of India and 
the Government of Pakistan, but also included a dispute between the state government of J&K 
and the Government of India. In addition, debates about Indus Basin hydropolitics were 
carried out by Indian experts in the English-language public sphere, thereby constituting a 
particular element to the overall Baglihar dispute.   
I have presented the analysis chronologically, and examined how several experts 
entered the dispute at different times, and participated in debates on various sub-topics under 
the Baglihar dispute. These debates can be viewed as a form of conflict management, where 
the Indian experts provided knowledge and information, influenced by the new and growing 
field of studies of hydropolitics, i.e. the management of conflicts over water sharing.  
The experts provided important knowledge and information, and expert networks 
which pressure governments can be important for international environmental cooperation. 
However, at this point, the practical effects of the arguments Indian experts offered, on the 
process of the management of the Baglihar dispute, cannot be known. This thesis is therefore 
a preliminary attempt, as I have examined one arena of conflict management, and the informal 
management process this constitutes.  
 
India’s dilemma: J&K or Pakistan 
India had to balance their relations with J&K, who wanted to exploit the waters in the western 
rivers further, and with Pakistan, who objected to - and feared - Indian control over these 
rivers. J&K’s position stood in clear contrast to Pakistan’s, and India had to choose whose 
interest they would prioritize. J&K was a part of India, and it would be logical for India to 
prioritize J&K. However, neglecting the Pakistan position could open up Pandora’s Box; it 
could lead to violent conflicts over water.  
Since the IWT was signed in 1960, India and Pakistan had managed to avoid conflict 
over water. However, by constructing hydropower projects in J&K, India could potentially 
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violate the treaty. Although the causal relationship between water scarcity and violent conflict 
is much debated, the mere possibility of a violent conflict over water seemed to affect the 
Indian Indus Basin policy.  
India avoided violent conflict during the Baglihar dispute, but their water sharing 
relations with Pakistan remained tense and conflictual. An increasing number of scholars 
joined the hydropolitical debates during the Baglihar dispute. When the Baglihar dispute 
officially ended, the Kishenganga dispute arose, and as long as India continues to build hydro 
plants on the western rivers, which they plan to do, Pakistan will probably object to most of 
them and new disputes will arise.  
 
Putting the Baglihar dispute in a historical context 
Why did Pakistan object to the Baglihar dam when, in the words of John Briscoe, “they could 
be spending their scarce human resources on more productive areas, like improving the 
management of water.”428 As shown in this thesis, there were different suggestions on what 
the Pakistani motives for objecting was, and it can best be answered by contextualizing the 
Baglihar dispute in the history of water sharing between India-Pakistan.  
When The World Bank presented a proposal for an Indus river-water sharing treaty in 
1954, India immediately agreed to it, but Pakistan refused. The Pakistani leaders refused to 
sign in 1954 because the allocation of water according to the treaty-proposal would be 
devastating to agricultural areas in the Punjab province, previously irrigated by water from 
Ravi, Beas and Sutlej.  
Pakistan finally agreed to sign the IWT in 1960, when they received a huge one-time 
financial assistance, enabling them to construct dams and canals for transferring water from 
the western to the eastern rivers in the Indus Basin. When Pakistan had completed these 
works, the waters of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab would support the agriculture of the whole 
river basin.  
The IWT was successful as a conflict resolution, and it is generally accepted that the 
IWT worked satisfactory the first 30-40 years. However, it functioned because there were few 
hydropolitical disputes in the Indus Basin. As Iyer have written, the PIC “merely had to 
monitor the implementation of the treaty”.429   
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It was not before the late 1990s that the treaty came under stress. Suba Chandran wrote 
in 2009, that the IWT was “signed in 1960, almost fifty years back, in a different political, 
economic, demographic, ecological and energy environment. Today there has been a 
considerable change in all these five areas”.430 In 1960, it was acceptable to split the 
allocation of water in the river basin between two political units, but the increasing water 
scarcity in the Indus Basin the next 40 years made the allocations of water under the IWT 
outdated in terms of water management.  
Along with the changes Chandran described, there was an increased interest in India, 
and especially in J&K, to utilize the hydropower potential in the western rivers. However, 
when India signed the IWT in 1960, they accepted that they could not utilize the western 
rivers in any consumptive uses. Officials in J&K had never been satisfied with the IWT, but 
in the late 1990s they criticized the Government of India and the IWT more frequently.  
Before 2002, most Indian experts ignored the criticism towards the IWT in J&K. 
Although most Indian experts agreed that the IWT hindered optimal water management in the 
Indus Basin, they viewed it as an acceptable treaty, because there had been few disputes and 
no conflicts over water since the treaty came into being. Avoiding conflicts was viewed as 
more important than enhancing water management, especially by Iyer. Swain on the other 
hand, connected these two, writing that enhanced water management could reduce the risk of 
conflict over water.  
 
Debates on abrogation of the Indus Waters Treaty 
While the Indian experts ignored the perspectives in J&K, the Indian Government at that time 
responded to it by initiating the construction of Baglihar. It had been on the drawing board 
since the early 1990s, but construction was not initiated before 1999. When Pakistan learned 
that Baglihar was under construction, they objected to it. Even though the IWT allowed India 
to construct run-of-the-river plants, Pakistan argued that Baglihar had too much storage 
capacity which would give India too much control over the Chenab River. Most Indian 
experts ignored the Pakistani objections at that time. Iyer suggested that Baglihar was only 
difficult to resolve because of the poor political relations between India and Pakistan at that 
time.  
Pakistan’s formal objection to Baglihar coincided with severe sedimentation issues at 
the Salal dam. India considered violating the IWT by flushing silt through gated spillways at 
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the dam, in order to make the hydroelectric plant operational again. Together with the IWT-
critique in J&K, these concerns led to a debate on whether India should abrogate the IWT. 
Indian Minister of Water Resources, Bijoya Chakraborty, gave words to the seriousness of the 
situation: "If we decide to scrap the Indus Water Treaty, then there will be drought in Pakistan 
and the people of that country would have to beg for every drop of water."
431
  
Iyer and Verghese joined the debate and labeled abrogation as ridiculous, because it 
would lead to uncertainty and perhaps violent conflict over water. Chellaney suggested, as the 
only Indian expert, that India should abrogate the IWT and build several hydro plants which 
could be used as water weapons against Pakistan. India followed Iyer and Verghese’s 
recommendation, and stood by the IWT.  
 Indo-Pakistani relations seemed to be improving in 2004, but that did not enable India 
and Pakistan to solve the Baglihar dispute. Even though Pakistan warned several times that 
they considered taking the Baglihar dispute to a neutral expert, most Indian experts were 
surprised when Pakistan did so, in 2005.  This might suggest that there is an unclear 
connection between hydropolitics and political relations in general, i.e. that water issues are 
special. It has been pointed out repeatedly that India and Pakistan‘s cooperation under the 
IWT during wartime is remarkable. During the Baglihar dispute, several experts and other 
observers were surprised that India and Pakistan did not manage to solve the Baglihar dispute 
bilaterally at a time relations seemed to be improving. 
 
The Pakistani view  
Pakistan’s request for a neutral expert attracted a lot of attention in Indian media and among 
Indian experts. Several experts immediately began analysis the Pakistani view on Indus Basin 
hydropolitics. Similar to how Iyer in 2002 had connected the unresolved Baglihar to the 
troubled Indo-Pakistani relations, several Indian experts suggested that Pakistan’s request for 
a neutral expert was not motivated by their need for water; it was “political”. Verghese argued 
that Musharraf had taken a recent “U-turn” on water issues, and that Pakistan only objected to 
Baglihar in order to hinder development in J&K.
432
  Waslekar’s empirical study of the 
Pakistani view rejected Verghese’s claim. His studies showed that there was a real worry in 
Pakistan that Baglihar would threaten their water supply and that it gave India too much 
control over the river flow in Chenab.  
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| In other words, the Baglihar dispute was a core issue of national interest for Pakistan. 
Iyer and Verghese both argued that there was no reason for Pakistan to worry, because 
Pakistan’s water supply was safeguarded in the IWT regulations. But some Indian observers 
suggested that India needed to recognize the Pakistani perspectives in order to avoid conflict 
over water. However, the Pakistani position was opposite to the position of J&K, and how 
could India heed J&K’s call for hydropower investments without provoking Pakistan? 
 
Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty 
Several of the Indian experts suggested that a solution to the hydropolitical dispute was to 
renegotiate the IWT. Verghese, Swain, Waslekar and Chandran advocated that a new Indus-
treaty should be based on basic IWRM-principles, such as treating the river basin as one 
hydrological unit, and implementing joint Indo-Pakistan projects. This would arrange for 
optimized usage of the river water, for the benefit of both India and Pakistan.  
However, Iyer called renegotiation unrealistic. Nation states are generally unwilling to 
give up sovereignty over natural resources, and Iyer argued that an attempt at renegotiating 
the IWT would have opened up old settled issues, leading to an increasing number of 
hydropolitical conflicts in the Indus Basin. Iyer delegitimized critique towards the IWT, 
whether it stemmed from India or Pakistan, because he deemed there were no other realistic 
alternative. Again, Iyer emphasized that avoiding conflict was more critical than enhancing 
water management.  
India acted, like they did during the entire Baglihar dispute, closely in line with Iyer’s 
recommendations: sticking to the IWT, and trusting that either the PIC or the other dispute-
resolving mechanisms would solve water disputes.  
 
The importance of Indian experts  
Experts entered the debates on different times. The debates were reactions to the hydropolitics 
of the region. However, the reactions often came late, if they came at all. The dissatisfaction 
in J&K in the late 1990s, and the first Pakistani objections to the Baglihar dam, was largely 
ignored by Indian experts. The Kashmiri and the Pakistani views attracted little attention 
before the legislative assembly of J&K demanded a review of the IWT in 2002, and the 
Government of Pakistan took the Baglihar dispute to a neutral expert in 2005.  
The importance of Indian experts can perhaps be examined by comparing the Baglihar 
dispute (1999-2008) with the Salal dispute (1974-1978). Although most scholars seem to 
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agree that the IWT functioned well before the 1990s, it is necessary to question why the Salal 
dispute has been perceived as successful by some Indian observers. Former Foreign Secretary 
of India, Jagat S. Mehta, played a decisive part in the Salal negotiations, and when resolving 
the dispute in 1978, Mehta accepted that the gated spillways at Salal were permanently 
closed. The Salal dam became an inefficient and costly project, mainly because of lack of 
sediment-control. Later, Mehta argued that professional engineers “must not be allowed to 
dominate and determine the strategy or inhibit broader and long-term goals.”433 According to 
Mehta, engineers tended to be too occupied with details, while Foreign Secretaries such as 
himself, were more likely to make “bolder decisions”.434  
This was an example of how effective conflict-resolution could have considerable 
downsides in terms of costs and water management, much like the IWT itself.  The resolution 
to the Salal dispute, and the IWT, have both functioned politically, but have gradually failed 
in terms of water management. 
It took ten years to construct Baglihar, and costs increased because of the dispute with 
Pakistan and the involvement of a neutral expert, but the sediment-control at Baglihar, 
enabled through gated spillways, will probably make it a more efficient project than the Salal. 
It would therefore be interesting to do a study of the influence of Indian water experts’ in the 
Salal dispute and compare it with experts’ role in the Baglihar dispute. At the time of this 
writing, it is too early to judge whether the Baglihar has been a successful project, and there is 
no available source material in order to examine the influence of experts upon the Indian 
government. 
 
Baglihar and future disputes 
The Baglihar dispute was the first Indo-Pakistani water dispute that was resolved by a neutral 
expert, and several Indian experts thought it would have precedent setting importance. 
However, in the PIC-meetings the first few years after the Baglihar verdict, new disputes 
arouse and the Baglihar verdict seemed largely irrelevant in these new cases. Especially the 
Kishenganga verdict was opposite to the Baglihar verdict on the issue of gated spillways, and 
Pakistan will therefore probably continue to object to future Indian projects in order to hinder 
India from increasing their control over the western rivers. 
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Although the Baglihar verdict did not set precedent it is still an important dispute. It 
showed that the IWT still functioned as a set of rules which India and Pakistan accepted, in a 
period of changing Indo-Pakistani relations and increased water scarcity. While several 
experts suggested that the IWT must be renegotiated, in order to deal with water scarcity in 
the Indus Basin, it seemed unrealistic that India and Pakistan could manage their water 
resources jointly. Iyer argued that the water management in the Indus Basin must be improved 
unilaterally, and was supported by a study from 2009 which suggested that “there is scope for 
unilateral action [which] could prevent future conflict and improve people’s lives within 
Pakistan and India”.435 
If there is causation between water scarcity and water conflict, India and Pakistan 
seemed to be on the verge of violent conflict during the Baglihar dispute. India and Pakistan 
continued to cooperate on water issues according to a water treaty that was signed five 
decades earlier. India’s hydropolitical policy during the Baglihar dispute was closely in line 
with the recommendations of Iyer, seemingly prioritizing the demands from J&K, but 
managing to avoid violation of the IWT at the same time. When India begins construction of 
new hydro plants – there are many on the drawing board – Pakistan will probably object, and 
there will be a new dispute. Some of these disputes might take form as scholarly debates, 
others as violent conflicts. It is perhaps timely to repeat the quote of Wolf, from the 
introduction of this thesis: 
 
Water is never the single - and hardly ever the major - cause of conflict. But it can 
exacerbate existing tensions and therefore must be considered within the larger context 




Further research could perhaps explore if any violent conflicts, such as the Kargil Conflict, or 
terror attacks, such as the Mumbai attacks in 2008, was connected to Indus Basin 
hydropolitics. 
 
The different directions of the Baglihar dispute 
The complexity of hydropolitics and water management makes it a topic which easily can be 
drawn in different directions, within different contexts. Along the decade long Baglihar 
dispute, the arguments of Indian experts varied to some extent. There were of course 
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differences (and similarities) between the separate experts, but the positions of the experts 
also seemed to change. One of the more explicit examples was Iyer, who referred to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses as a 
reason for India to keep the treaty in 2002, but later deemed the convention irrelevant in a 
debate with a Pakistani scholar. Another example was Verghese, who regularly pointed at the 
issues of water management in the Indus Basin, suggesting that renegotiating the IWT would 
be best for the ecology of the region. At other times however, Verghese delegitimized the 
Pakistani water worries, based on the argument that Pakistan’s water supply was safeguarded 
in the IWT. An example of another kind was Chellaney, who recommended that India utilized 
the economic and military potential of the Indus River system in 2002, and later argued that 
drastic acts were necessary in order to avoid conflict over water in Asia.  
 The point being that within the Baglihar disputes there were several sub-disputes or 
debates, which have been tracked throughout this thesis, and the Baglihar dispute took on 
different meanings for the Indian experts in the various debates. This thesis has merely 
focused on one aspect of the Baglihar dispute, the informal conflict management process, 
constituted by Indian experts. Further research on the Baglihar dispute could explore other 
aspects on how disputes about river-water sharing can assume different forms in various 
debates, depending on its context, i.e. who are the debaters; when and where is the debate 
taking place; what were the goal of their debate participant, and who were their intended 
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